Long overdue update...

Lots going on, so I will get right to it...

Iraq, Democratization and the Middle East
The Washington Monthly ran a wonderful report in their May issue on the possible effects of the Iraq War on recent democratization and liberalization (yes, they are two different things) in the Middle East. Not surprisingly, the the seven authors invited to reflect on recent events came to different conclusions (although they all seemed at least somewhat skeptical). Over the next few days two political scientists, Dan Drezner from U of Chicago and danieldrezner.com, and Marc Lynch from Williams College and Abu Aardvark, to further debate and discuss this important topic. The debate itself will be posted at Political Animal starting some time this morning. I have already weighed in with my thoughts here. It is certainly too early to tell--in fact, we may need about a decade after solid democratization and consolidation before we can accurately asses and weight the causes of these transformations--but the correlation itself is worthy of examination. In either case I am sure current events will do for Samuel Huntington's The Third Wave what 9/11 did for his Clash of Civilizations (for the record, the former was flawed but insightful and worth a read given current events--the latter is flawed and lacks strong theoretical and empirical foundations, but that is just my opinion...).

China and Taiwan
Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution wrote an interesting op-ed over the weekend in the Financial Times (subscription only) regarding the likelihood of war breaking out between Taiwan and China--an issue I have also discussed (for links see here).

Here are the highlights:

"In the absence of strong constraints on future high-technology sales, lifting the European arms embargo on China would be a big mistake. There really is a chance of a Sino-US war over Taiwan, which may ebb and flow month to month but nonetheless remains quite real. And any European decision to lift the embargo could make any war more likely and more costly in lives and assets.

The reasons are simple. First, China is serious about being willing to risk war to prevent Taiwan's secession. Second, although many in China as well as Europe cannot quite believe it, the US is just as serious about defending Taiwan. And third, even though American military power remains far superior to that of China, the Chinese do not need to equal US power to make any war over nearby Taiwan very challenging for American forces. Given the right catalyst from Taipei, therefore, US deterrence of China could fail and the world's first true war between nuclear weapons states could ensue.

It is not just China's ruling communist party that considers Taiwan a part of China an increasingly nationalistic population does as well. In fact, the Chinese see themselves as patient and restrained because they are simply demanding that Taiwan not secede, rather than insisting on immediate reunification. They worry that if Taiwan broke away, it would encourage other separatist movements in places such as Tibet and Xinjiang province, and weaken China strategically at the very moment it is poised to regain its status as a global power. China's leaders operate on the assumption that Taiwanese secession would doom their own prospects for holding on to power. At a minimum, they would have to show they had gone the extra mile to try to prevent secession, meaning that even an unsuccessful military operation might be preferable to inaction. And as bizarre as it may seem, the US really would fight to prevent faraway Taiwan from being conquered.

This is true not only because President George W. Bush publicly said so in 2001, but also for deeper reasons. First, US credibility as a dependable security partner would be on the line in any conflict over Taiwan. After a half-century of coming to Taiwan's aid in crises, to back down when the going got tough would cause every other US ally around the world to doubt the strength of America's commitment. Among other implications, more countries might then pursue their own nuclear deterrents. Second, and more positively, Taiwan's vibrant democracy elicits strong support in the US. This goes for Democrats as well as Republicans; it was the Clinton administration, after all, that sent two aircraft carriers toward the Taiwan Strait in 1996 in reaction toChina's firing of missiles near the island.

Unfortunately, many Chinese doubt America's real commitment to Taiwan. Some argue that the US is casualty averse (despite the evidence from Iraq) and would back down from a fight over a distant island - especially a fight against another nuclear-armed state. They realise there is no binding treaty obliging the US to defend the island, and that the language of America's 1979 Taiwan Relations Act as well as other policy statements would give Washington numerous excuses not to fight (especially if, in Chinese eyes at least, Taiwan had clearly provoked the war). Other Chinese believe their recent successes in diplomatically and economically wooing much of the Asia-Pacific region - and Europe - mean that the US rather than China>, would be isolated in any future conflict. Even the military balance gives China hope that it would emerge successful in a crisis over Taiwan. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan remains highly unlikely, given the inherent difficulties of amphibious assault in an era of 24-hour reconnaissance and precision strike capabilities. But China has other military tools and options. In addition to threatening missile attacks, for example, it may be able to conduct a naval blockade of Taiwan. Estimates differ over the strength of the American force needed to defeat such a Chinese attempt, and the losses that would be incurred. But this very uncertainty may give Beijing hope, and a lifting of Europe's arms embargo could give it even more hope. The chances of a Sino-US war over Taiwan are not enormous, but are sufficiently real to be taken seriously. It is for Europeans to determine their future policy on selling arms to China, of course. But the US is on solid ground in asking that any new policy be made with eyes wide open about the huge strategic and military stakes at play."

I am still baffled that many in Europe were surprised by the strong reaction by the US to the proposed lifting of the embargo. How on earth could you be surprised, unless you have been living under a rock for the last 50 years, not mention that last 4 years. Taiwan is considerd of critical importance to the US, less for it offers strategically than for what it means for US credibility and reputation. Outside observers might think it odd that the US still sees Taiwan as non-negotiable, but the fact is they do. Maintaining the status quo is crucial in the eyes of US policy makers and any shift--for instance the lifting of an arms embargo which might pave the way for critical high-tech transfers to China which could begin shifting the balance of power in the region--is sure to draw their ire.

Meet the Mets
Finally, the Mets managed to pull out a victory last night against the Nationals, stopping their losing streak at 4 games. With Pedro on the hill tonight opening a 4 game set against the hapless Phils can a winning streak be far behind?

Tags: Middle East , Democratization , China, Taiwan, US, International Relations