Cross-strait tensions on the rise?

Recent moves by the Chinese, the US, and the EU has increased tension in the Taiwan straits. This convoluted issue has been quiet for some time, but with the EU set to repeal an arms embargo in place since 1989, China’s pending passage of an anti-secession law, and the US dialing up the rhetoric vis-à-vis China (as well as formalizing with Japan their strategic concern for Taiwan), I would venture to say that the region is poised to become hot once again.

Essentially, the anti-secession law is targeted squarely at Taiwan, regarded by mainland China as a renegade province. To date, China has been deterred from forcibly taking the island due to the balance of power that exists between themselves and Taiwan (largely due to US arms sales to Taiwan) as well as vague US threats to intervene and defend Taiwan should China try to take the island by force. Maintaining the status quo has long been the policy of the US--a status quo that essentially restricts actions in Taiwan that signal a desire for formal independence as well as attempts by China to revise the current situation. However, many observers have noted that while the situation appears stable it could change quickly due to unexpected actions and reactions on the part of the various players.

For example, Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian (a pro-independence figure) has threatened to "retaliate" if the mainland passes the anti-secession law. At this point the law is a sure thing--the leadership in China could not afford to back down for fear of loosing face domestically (as well as internationally). The ball will then be in Taiwan's court, where any number of reactions is likely. The most inflammatory would be a referendum on independence, a measure President Chen Shui-bian has alluded to previously in response to the anti-secession law. While it is unlikely that Chen would risk an almost certain escalation by China in response to the referendum, Chen is likely to take measures that illustrate his dedication to Taiwanese independence as well as the state’s resolve in general. By not reacting, Taiwan risks sending a signal to the mainland that further moves would not be met with much force. Additionally, Chen draws electoral support from pro-independence elements within Taiwan—a failure to react would certainly damage his standing with a portion of voters critical for his political success. While neither party has an incentive to escalate to the use of force it is a situation that could easily arise given the incentives for both parties to demonstrate their resolve and dedication to the issue.

An added bit of complexity comes from moves by additional powers. As noted, the EU is set to lift a 15 year arms embargo against China which the US has vehemently opposed. The embargo was instituted in 1989 after the Chinese government brutally put down the student protests in Tiananmen Square. The US has argued that by allowing the Chinese to purchase European weapons systems China can quickly shift the balance of power in the straits in their favor. A likely response to a Chinese military buildup with European weapons would be an increase in US arms sales to Taiwan, further increasing regional tensions. Additionally, the US and Japan recently reaffirmed their commitment to security cooperation in the region, only this time with an added twist—for the first time they explicitly listed Taiwan as a common security issue. The statement merely stated that they viewed a peaceful resolution to the crisis as on their security interests, but this action was viewed angrily by Beijing since Japan is viewed as its main rival in the region (besides the US). The Joint Statement issued by the US and Japan came on the heels of increasingly suspicious rhetoric from both the CIA and the Pentagon that China’s military buildup is disturbing and threatens US capabilities in the region. It seems that the US is now turning its attention back to China—a security concern that has been somewhat muted since 9/11 and the run up to the Iraq War.

So what does all this mean? Is there likely to be trouble in the straits any time soon? It all depends on the reaction of Taiwan to the anti-secession law. If President Chen takes bold steps in an effort to signal the Chinese—and to this constituents—that Taiwan will not allow China to take such bold steps then trouble is likely to ensue. The mere mention of an independence referendum could be enough to force China to engage in accelerated military exercises. These exercises would likely force the US (and now Japan) to react by sending naval support to the straits (but not actually in the straits) to monitor the exercises, much as the US did during the 1995-96 crisis. In the short run, however, even this scenario shouldn’t be enough to lead the US and China into a direct confrontation over Taiwan. China is still a number of years away from acquiring the military resources necessary to take the island. Even if the EU lifts the arms embargo it is still not clear exactly what and how much the Europeans would be willing to sell the mainland. US pressure may likely limit the extent to which EU arms will actually impact the balance of power in the straits. Until the balance shifts in their favor it is unlikely that even bold provocation by Taiwan, such as a referendum or military exercises, is likely to elicit a direct military reaction by the mainland.

The only possibility in the short run would be ‘war by accident’—essentially a situation where both China and Taiwan take steps that commit them to further action. Increased public threats by both parties could have the effect of tying there hands so that the costs of backing down would be too much to bear domestically and internationally (lets not forget that although the mainland is still politically communist the leadership has used the issue of Taiwan as a legitimacy building measure—failure to act would certainly anger the general public and place the regime on the defensive domestically). This scenario depends less on the objective balance of power between the two states and more on the choices of leaders in both countries, the inferences they draw from each other’s actions and the reaction by both domestic and international actors to these actions. If Taiwan is emboldened by a tough US-Japan response and reads this as a signal that they are willing to enter the fray President Chen may feel the time is right to call the referendum. Such a move would place the leadership of China in a precarious position since there would be domestic pressure to react as well pressure to ensure that the mainland does not look irresolute over the issue in the eyes of the US and Japan.

In any case these moves are sure to lead to a serious diplomatic, if not military, confrontation in the future, if not the short term. It is certainly a story worth watching.

Filed as:Politics, Taiwan, China, US Foreign Policy