Conceding vs. Standing Firm: A new trend in US proliferation policy?

Cross posted at "The Duck":

Last week I (sort of) complained about the recent move by the US to allow Iran to begin the membership ascension process to the WTO in exchange for a further (not permanent) freeze on uranium enrichment until August, when presumably the EU3 can hammer out a more permanent deal with the Persian power. The US has refused to directly take part in the negotiations, but has worked with the EU3 in order to deploy a number of carrots and sticks. Agreeing to not veto Iranian ascension to the WTO (which has been a perennial event) seems to me to be an awfully big carrot, one that Iran has coveted for a while and which allows them to pontificate on the previous injustice of not allowing them to join (quote or link here), considering that all the US/EU got in return was an extension of the temporary freeze until August. (For a different, yet equally critical take on the recent agreement on the grounds that the US still lacks a coherent approach towards Iran check out this editorial in the FT today.)

Thursday, the Financial Times reported that the US may be signaling to the North Koreans that it would consider parallel bilateral talks with Pyongyang‚--something the North Koreans covet and the US has vigorously denied them since the crisis broke out. Again, this can be viewed as an example of the US giving in to a key demand in order to simply extend the bargaining game rather than extract any crucial concessions that further its interests. Both scenarios possibly illustrate the decrease in the US's bargaining position (or, more appropriately, the actual reality of this position all along) vis-a-vis these two potential nuclear powers (let's assume for the moment North Korea doesn’t have a workable weapon, which is a big assumption).

In both cases these states have had to give up nothing essentially in return for concrete concessions that they highly value. In each case the US has reversed its previous stance on issues of high salience (granted, in terms of the WTO we have our reasons for wanting Iran in, see Peter Howard's take on this which I largely agree with‚--but the US certainly has not wanted to deal with North Korea bilaterally, that much is clear). These moves make me wonder whether or not the US has come to the realization that their bargaining position is not as strong as they previously thought. In the case of North Korea they have not managed to make any kind of progress, with the North Korean’s continuing with enrichment as well as potentially gearing up for an underground test explosion. China refuses to play a decisive role, something that many agree is necessary in order to force North Korea to cease development. Iran does not seem to be scared of a US invasion/regime change given that the situation in Iraq has, if anything, signaled to potential adversaries the severe limitations of the US military to invade, occupy, and secure foreign lands—especially to manage two of these operations at the same time. Furthermore, Iran continuously threatened to accelerate its program if the US submitted them to the Security Council for economic sanctions. Economics seems to be of more concern to the Iranians than invasion, yet yesterday’s move essentially rewards Iran economically for a simply extension and not a permanent deal. In both cases the targets of US compellance have stood firm and essentially won concessions while the US has given in.

It will be interesting to see what each target—Iran and North Korea—learns from these recent moves. What conclusions will they draw from recent US behavior? Will further concessions in the case of Iran reassure the North Koreans that the US can be bargained with? Will Iran now expect direct negotiations with the US if they take place with North Korea? Certainly one could view US moves in this way, as a deliberate strategy to get these two states to trust the US more and to believe that their cooperation will be rewarded in kind by the US. However, the US should be aware of the fact that such signals cannot be counted on to objectively convey that they are trustworthy or credible partners. Both North Korea and Iran must interpret US actions through their own lenses that are influenced by previous encounters and the images they already have of the US. Additionally, the realm of international politics doesn’t lend itself easily to trust given the high stakes and the incentives others have to misrepresent their intentions.

Stay tuned...

Filed as: US, Iran, North Korea, Nuclear Proliferation

Morning Notes...

Trying something new today. Given my weekday schedule this summer I am going to try and adjust how I blog so that I can update the site more frequently. So starting today I will be writing short posts about (relatively) breaking news and developing stories of the day. I will try to do this everyday but it will more likely be every two days. If I find one of the stories compelling enough I might blog at length about sometime in the evening, but that all depends. Anyway, here is the first installment of "Morning Notes"...

'Non' Fallout Begins

Following the French No vote on Sunday to the EU constitution, President Chirac began the cabinet shakeup he promised by replacing Jean-Pierre Raffarin as prime minister with former interior minister Dominique de Villepin. US citizens most likely remember de Villepin as the French foreign minister who became the face of opposition to the Iraq War at the UN. The move seems targeted outside of France, as de Villepin is highly regarded by European allies. Chirac certainly has some PR work ahead of him internationally, as many at the EU are calling for the shelving of the charter for a few years until France and the Netherlands (who holds their own vote June 1st, which is predicted to reject the constitution) can reverse their populations' opinion on the constitution. For those looking for an analysis of why the French voted as they did, we are having a discussion over at "the Duck". Contributions so far include Patrick and myself--Dan's should be forthcoming.

Let the Trade Wars Begin

The US will ask for a WTO dispute settlement panel to halt European subsidies to Airbus. Europe has said they will retaliate by counter-filing over Boeing (classic tit-for-tat strategy). In other news, China is dropping up to 81 export tariffs on clothing and textiles aimed at the EU and the US. The US has already imposed limits on textile imports from China and the EU is threatening to do the same. This dispute is likely to grow in the coming weeks.

"All Fired Up"

Taking a page out of Pat Benatar's book, Israeli Finance Minister Binyamin Netanyahu was a little 'hot under the collar'--literally--during a press conference over the weekend.


Filed as: EU Constitution, France, de Villepin, US, EU, Trade Wars, China, Netanyahu

Update: "No EU for You!"

According to exit polls French citizens said "thanks, but no thanks" to the EU constitution today. The "No" campaign ended up with 55% of the vote, just about where pre-referendum polls had it. Chirac commented that he believed part of the reason why the referendum failed was due to citizens expressing their displeasure with Chirac's policies rather than a statement on France's perception of the EU. Further analysis is needed to determine whether Chirac is correct, although I suspect that the cast of characters that voted the constitution down included those groups that are most likely to dislike Chirac's policies as well as the EU--stay tuned...

Filed as: EU, France

Blame Newsweek...

Not going to comment on the new unified theory of global unrest and anti-US sentiment--i.e. Newsweek Instability Theory--simply don't have the strength. In the meantime, check out this animated editorial cartoon which pretty much sums it up (thanks to Bill for the link)

Filed as: Newsweek, Koran, anti-US sentiment

Further proof that Rep. Tom Delay is a complete _________ (fill in your favorite expletive)

Once again, Wonkette makes life bearable--make sure you actually read the Reuters story at the bottom...

Filed as: Tom Delay

Double Duty...

If you get a chance, check out Duck of Minerva from time to time--I will be "group blogging" there with Dan Nexon of Georgetown U. and Patrick Jackson of American U. Enjoy your Memorial Day weekend...

"No EU for You!"

Keep an eye on the referndum vote in France this weekend (scheduled for Sunday) over ratifying the EU constitution. France has become somewhat of a symbolic battle ground for the pro-Europe, anti-Europe crowds. France has long been a driving force in European integration and a "Non" vote in Sunday's election has many worried about its ramifications for the future of the project. The FT reported on Thursday that heads of state who are pro-Europe are undecided as to what steps should be taken if any one of the 25 member states votes "No". The two most likely "No's" at this time are France and the Netherlands (who votes in June). Current EU president and Luxemburg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker has argued that No from one country should not dictate the actions of the remaining states. Juncker notes that all 25 member states should attempt to ratify regardless of any No votes. On the other hand, Britain's Tony Blair has argued that if any state votes No the heads of the EU governments would have to debate what the proper "way forward" should be, indicating that the remaining states should not continue with their ratification measures. In any event, if the French or the Dutch vote No most European leaders would push ahead with thier votes and also push these two states to hold new referendums(even though both states have tried to "tie their hands" by stating this will be the only opportunity to ratify the constitution)--basically keep voting until they get the answer they want. In any event I think the campaign for an EU yes spells a no for Chirac in 2007 (he has indicated he may seek a third term). The French people are becoming increasingly weary of economic reforms that they view as too neoliberal (a main reason why they oppose the EU constitution) and with Chirac essentially placing his political reputation on the line for this issue I think he will be out even if he gets his Euro-yes. Stay tuned...

Filed as: EU, France

South Korea's Central Bank Rocks the Boat....Again

It seems as if the central bank of South Korea just doesn't get it (or maybe they do--as Matt and I have discussed before--see our comments here). Last week the South Korean Central Bank signaled that it might stop intervening in currency markets, noting that it was now comfortable with its currency reserves. Here is the specific quote in question:

"I believe that we now have sufficient reserves to secure our sovereign credibility so I do not anticipate increasing the amount of foreign reserves further," Park was quoted as saying."

"We now need to take more consideration of profitability and I think we're at a stage where we need to manage our reserves in a more useful way."

Although Park made no explicit comment on the won, the remarks were taken to imply that South Korea was now unwilling to undertake the intervention required to stem its currency's rise.

'Shockingly', this move precipitated a sharp rise in the won against the dollar. Later, the Central Bank denied the report, noting that "The Bank of Korea will take necessary measures whenever the currency markets are unstable...Especially, we will not sit idly by if speculative funds come in to exploit a groundless news report."

Now there are a few ways to look at this (as noted here). Either the Central Banks are playing a game of brinksmanship with the US, rocking the boat just enough to get action that they see as necessary (i.e. reduction of the US current account and budget deficit, an increase in the value of the dollar, etc.), they are incompetent to some degree, or they are trying their darndest to balance the need to rationally adjust policy with the risk of sending the wrong signals to the international markets. I am partial to the third option, although I am becoming increasingly interested in the possibility of the first as a viable strategy (and an empirical reality)...

Filed as: Political Economy, South Korea, United States

Puzzled over our policy on Iranian nukes...

It seems as though the EU3 and Iran have struck a deal that further delays Iran's (what I see as the inevitable) acquisition of a working nuclear weapon. As a reward for agreeing to extend its freeze on uranium enrichment, Iran will be allowed to begin membership ascension to the WTO. Key to the agreement was the ability of the US and the EU to stay unified and for the US to agree to lift its veto on Iranian WTO membership:

“It was a last-minute thing that could have broken down if the Americans had stepped back [from their commitment on the WTO],” one diplomat told the Financial Times.

After the US confirmed that it would lift its perennial veto on WTO accession talks, Tehran agreed to maintain a freeze on its nuclear programme until early August, by which time France, Germany and the UK will produce new proposals for a settlement."

So while the US is refusing to take part in talks with the Iranians this latest move certainly illustrates that they certainly willing to bargain with Iran over their nuclear program. My question is why? I seriously doubt that any package of carrots can delay a nuclear Iran indefinitely. Nuclear weapons are viewed as incredibly valuable for states as a failsafe against foreign intervention (with many taking Iraq as an example of what not to do--he who hesitates ends up in a hole--and on the cover of a tabloid in his tidy whities). Iran certainly does not feel overly secure given their perception of the US, Israel and their desire to be a regional power. So there are great incentives for Iran to acquire even a minimal nuclear deterrent (MAD is not necessary to achieve deterrence--for anyone interested see Avery Goldstein's Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution). Given this, and given the hawkish nature of the current administration, I fail to see why they see this move as a good idea--especially when the argument used against providing economic carrots to North Korea is that it will simply by them time to complete production. Why should we view Iran any differently?

Filed as: Iran, United States, Nuclear Proliferation

US Grand Strategy

For those interested in an erudite discussion of US grand strategy and the hard choices that must be made (yes, currently we are "muddling through" by failing to committ to a single organizing principle--declaratory policy certainly does not match up well with actual policy implementation), check out Stephen Biddle's American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment. Biddle is a brilliant commentator on military affairs and the peice does a nice job of framing the question as one that is more political than analytical--a distinction rarely made by analysts. Check it out.

Filed as: US Grand Strategy, International Politics

Now for something completely shameless

As you may have noticed I have added a search box to the sidebar for Amazon.com. If you search and buy items from Amazon.com through that little beauty over yonder I will recieve a teensy renumerance which will help me buy books for classes and research at Amazon. The best part is this costs you nothing--well, aside from what your orders costs. So if you are so inclined, please search and buy from my site. It will certainly be appreciated.

Republicans ready to "Bolt" on President's UN nominee?

Yesterday, the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) voted 10-8 along party lines to send the nomination to the floor for a vote. However, in a surprising move aimed at getting Bolton to a vote, the committee did not endorse the President's nominee. This move sets up an interesting scenario since numerous Republicans, who were not thrilled with the choice of Bolton, now have some political cover should they wish to vote down the nominee. The Financial Times has a good summary here and here. This compromise was necessary because Republican Senator George Voinovich of Ohio threatened to (forgive the pun) bolt, thereby leaving the nomination in committee. Mr. Bolton has not been warmly embraced by all members of his party, and this sets up the interesting floor battle ahead. By receiving a nomination without the endorsement of the SFRC many of those Republicans unhappy with Bolton might just defect.

My take on Bolton is that he is a hardnosed hawk, plain and simple--and there is nothing inherently wrong with that. Now, this disposition may serve one well when they are the under-secretary of state for arms control and international security, but as far as a diplomatic post goes (especially US ambassador to the UN) I am more skeptical. Does the UN need reform? Yes. Has the UN been in need of said reform for years? You bet. But I fail to see why someone with less reputational baggage could not fill the post just as effectively and protect US interests. The main problem is not getting someone to represent the US at the UN who would take a much tougher stance on many issues that the President regards as vital to the US national interest. Many individuals could fulfill that task. Rather, the question is whether Mr. Bolton will essentially provide cover for those at the UN who do not wish to work with the US on numerous issues. They can easily point to Bolton as a "bully" and a hardliner who seeks to run roughshod over the UN and the international community. Now, would he necessarily be doing this--probably not. But it gives a wonderful excuse and political cover to those who do not wish to work with the US (and its a pretty long list unfortunately). Diplomacy is all about the subtle mixure of threats and compromise. By presenting a nominee to the world that tilts too far in either direction the US is asking for trouble. Getting tough at the UN and protecting US interests is possible without nominating someone as polarizing (before they even take up the position) as Mr. Bolton. Now it's in the Senate's hands. Developing...

Update: The Washington Post has a good article detailing who is likely to break with their respective parties on the floor vote--Democrat and Republican.

Filed as: Politics, John Bolton, United States, United Nations, International Relations

Gotta love Wonkette.....

On a related note, Wonkette has this tasty little tid-bit regarding the President's latest poll numbers and the apparent inability of people to understand what it is they actually approve of.

Filed as: Politics, President Bush, Approval Ratings

How many times can the middle class be the “screw-ee” yet still vote for the “screw-er”?

Well, I normally don’t post on domestic politics, but the President’s new “progressive” social security plan is just too incredible to pass up. Both Paul Krugman's op-ed and Political Animal provide a good summary and discussion of the proposed canard policy. Essentially, the President attempted to repackage his social security plan as a progressive step to increase benefits to lower income earners while increasing the amount contributed by the wealthy (my, this sounds an awful lot like wealth redistribution--isn't this exactly the kind of policy Republicans quickly jump all over and lable "communist" when proposed by Democrats??). But it in fact would accomplish neither of these as Krugman notes (my emphasis):

"In fact, it's a plan to slash middle-class benefits; the wealthy would barely feel a thing. Under current law, low-wage workers receive Social Security benefits equal to 49 percent of their wages before retirement. Under the Bush scheme, that wouldn't change. So benefits for the poor would be maintained, not increased.

The administration and its apologists emphasize the fact that under the Bush plan, workers earning higher wages would face cuts, and they talk as if that makes it a plan that takes from the rich and gives to the poor. But the rich wouldn't feel any pain, because people with high incomes don't depend on Social Security benefits.

The average worker - average pay now is $37,000 - retiring in 2075 would face a cut equal to 10 percent of pre-retirement income. Workers earning 60 percent more than average, the equivalent of $58,000 today, would see benefit cuts equal to almost 13 percent of their income before retirement."

So, obviously the President has proposed this package because members of the middle class don't vote for him anyway and he is trying to pander to the poor. Right? RIGHT????!!!

Apparently not. Here are the exit polls from November’s election broken down by voter income (the number in parentheses represents the percentage of voters in a particular income bracket):

Under $15,000 (8%): 36%

$15-30,000 (15%): 42%

$30-50,000 (22%): 49%

$50-75,000 (23%): 56%

$75-100,000 (14%): 55%

So what does this tell us? Well for starters, the two largest income brackets, which combine to make up 45% of voters—essentially the most important group—voted 49% and 56% respectively for Bush. Those middle income earners need to wake up and understand how the President's policies (especially this one) actually affect their interests. Stop buying into all the bells and whistles and start learning the facts.

Now, I don’t know about you, but the people I know making between $30,000 and $75,000 are middle class, and they certainly are not “higher earners” as the administration has labeled them. Are they higher relative to those making under $20,000? Well by definition, yes. But this isn’t about relative income, but rather one’s absolute income, their expenses, and their ability to support a family and be able to retire comfortably (the President is supposed to be for stronger families I believe, and unfortunately stronger families cost more). This would be perfectly fine if one's expenses decreased as their income increased. But this certianly does not happen. If you earn $45,000/year when you are young but eventually make $70,000/year over the course of your adult life you certainly have greater monetary resources. However, if over your lifetime you have three children, buy a bigger house, pay for college, clothe and feed those three children (because remember, family is important), and essentially try to save on your own for retirement your expenses essentially explode and that $70,000 probably feels a like a whole lot less than the $45,000 did. So it makes absoluately no sense to treat these individuals as if they are "higher income earners". Given this I can see why so many middle income voters decided to cast their ballots for President Bush. No really, I can....

I will be following this story, as should you....

Filed as: Politics, Social Security, President Bush, Middle Class

The British Election and the Iraq War

Rodger Payne has an interesting post over at his blog on the row over the Iraq War and its potential effect on Thursday's elections in the UK (You can also see it at Political Animal). While Blair seems set to remain Prime Minister the debate has created an opportunity to view some of the internal memos prepared for Blair before the Iraq War. Payne notes that the most interesting memo includes a rather interesting quote (highlighted below):

“Today, the Times of London printed a leaked document that purportedly demonstrates Blair's intent to go to war against Iraq long before March 2003. Minutes from a 23 July 2002 meeting were considered "extremely sensitive" and "no further copies should be made." Of course, now anyone can read it on the web. Here's a troubling paragraph based on an unnamed "C" present at the meeting (CNN reports that this is Sir Richard Dearlove):

‘C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.’”

Now, ‘But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy’ is an incredibly juicy line—does this mean that ‘C’ was conveying the thoughts and intentions of Washington? Or was he/she merely stating an opinion that the administration was massaging their data to fit the hypothesis that Saddam had WMDs and had connections to terrorism (terrorism that was actually a threat to the US)? Who knows. In either case this is certainly ammo for Bush critics—now the question is whether anyone in the US will pick up on this and run with it…

Filed as: Iraq War, US, International Relations

Long overdue update...

Lots going on, so I will get right to it...

Iraq, Democratization and the Middle East
The Washington Monthly ran a wonderful report in their May issue on the possible effects of the Iraq War on recent democratization and liberalization (yes, they are two different things) in the Middle East. Not surprisingly, the the seven authors invited to reflect on recent events came to different conclusions (although they all seemed at least somewhat skeptical). Over the next few days two political scientists, Dan Drezner from U of Chicago and danieldrezner.com, and Marc Lynch from Williams College and Abu Aardvark, to further debate and discuss this important topic. The debate itself will be posted at Political Animal starting some time this morning. I have already weighed in with my thoughts here. It is certainly too early to tell--in fact, we may need about a decade after solid democratization and consolidation before we can accurately asses and weight the causes of these transformations--but the correlation itself is worthy of examination. In either case I am sure current events will do for Samuel Huntington's The Third Wave what 9/11 did for his Clash of Civilizations (for the record, the former was flawed but insightful and worth a read given current events--the latter is flawed and lacks strong theoretical and empirical foundations, but that is just my opinion...).

China and Taiwan
Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution wrote an interesting op-ed over the weekend in the Financial Times (subscription only) regarding the likelihood of war breaking out between Taiwan and China--an issue I have also discussed (for links see here).

Here are the highlights:

"In the absence of strong constraints on future high-technology sales, lifting the European arms embargo on China would be a big mistake. There really is a chance of a Sino-US war over Taiwan, which may ebb and flow month to month but nonetheless remains quite real. And any European decision to lift the embargo could make any war more likely and more costly in lives and assets.

The reasons are simple. First, China is serious about being willing to risk war to prevent Taiwan's secession. Second, although many in China as well as Europe cannot quite believe it, the US is just as serious about defending Taiwan. And third, even though American military power remains far superior to that of China, the Chinese do not need to equal US power to make any war over nearby Taiwan very challenging for American forces. Given the right catalyst from Taipei, therefore, US deterrence of China could fail and the world's first true war between nuclear weapons states could ensue.

It is not just China's ruling communist party that considers Taiwan a part of China an increasingly nationalistic population does as well. In fact, the Chinese see themselves as patient and restrained because they are simply demanding that Taiwan not secede, rather than insisting on immediate reunification. They worry that if Taiwan broke away, it would encourage other separatist movements in places such as Tibet and Xinjiang province, and weaken China strategically at the very moment it is poised to regain its status as a global power. China's leaders operate on the assumption that Taiwanese secession would doom their own prospects for holding on to power. At a minimum, they would have to show they had gone the extra mile to try to prevent secession, meaning that even an unsuccessful military operation might be preferable to inaction. And as bizarre as it may seem, the US really would fight to prevent faraway Taiwan from being conquered.

This is true not only because President George W. Bush publicly said so in 2001, but also for deeper reasons. First, US credibility as a dependable security partner would be on the line in any conflict over Taiwan. After a half-century of coming to Taiwan's aid in crises, to back down when the going got tough would cause every other US ally around the world to doubt the strength of America's commitment. Among other implications, more countries might then pursue their own nuclear deterrents. Second, and more positively, Taiwan's vibrant democracy elicits strong support in the US. This goes for Democrats as well as Republicans; it was the Clinton administration, after all, that sent two aircraft carriers toward the Taiwan Strait in 1996 in reaction toChina's firing of missiles near the island.

Unfortunately, many Chinese doubt America's real commitment to Taiwan. Some argue that the US is casualty averse (despite the evidence from Iraq) and would back down from a fight over a distant island - especially a fight against another nuclear-armed state. They realise there is no binding treaty obliging the US to defend the island, and that the language of America's 1979 Taiwan Relations Act as well as other policy statements would give Washington numerous excuses not to fight (especially if, in Chinese eyes at least, Taiwan had clearly provoked the war). Other Chinese believe their recent successes in diplomatically and economically wooing much of the Asia-Pacific region - and Europe - mean that the US rather than China>, would be isolated in any future conflict. Even the military balance gives China hope that it would emerge successful in a crisis over Taiwan. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan remains highly unlikely, given the inherent difficulties of amphibious assault in an era of 24-hour reconnaissance and precision strike capabilities. But China has other military tools and options. In addition to threatening missile attacks, for example, it may be able to conduct a naval blockade of Taiwan. Estimates differ over the strength of the American force needed to defeat such a Chinese attempt, and the losses that would be incurred. But this very uncertainty may give Beijing hope, and a lifting of Europe's arms embargo could give it even more hope. The chances of a Sino-US war over Taiwan are not enormous, but are sufficiently real to be taken seriously. It is for Europeans to determine their future policy on selling arms to China, of course. But the US is on solid ground in asking that any new policy be made with eyes wide open about the huge strategic and military stakes at play."

I am still baffled that many in Europe were surprised by the strong reaction by the US to the proposed lifting of the embargo. How on earth could you be surprised, unless you have been living under a rock for the last 50 years, not mention that last 4 years. Taiwan is considerd of critical importance to the US, less for it offers strategically than for what it means for US credibility and reputation. Outside observers might think it odd that the US still sees Taiwan as non-negotiable, but the fact is they do. Maintaining the status quo is crucial in the eyes of US policy makers and any shift--for instance the lifting of an arms embargo which might pave the way for critical high-tech transfers to China which could begin shifting the balance of power in the region--is sure to draw their ire.

Meet the Mets
Finally, the Mets managed to pull out a victory last night against the Nationals, stopping their losing streak at 4 games. With Pedro on the hill tonight opening a 4 game set against the hapless Phils can a winning streak be far behind?

Tags: Middle East , Democratization , China, Taiwan, US, International Relations