Discord and Elaboration

Moving Day...

2005-09-29T21:32:00.000-04:00

Well, after a 6 months of on-again, off-again posting I am officially shutting Discord and Elaboration down (sort-of). I am finally past my comprehensive exams and am ready to post again, however the pressure of maintaing a site on my own is too much given other responsibilities that I must now attend to. Therefore, I will be posting but only at The Duck of Minerva, a group blog dedicated to international relations. I hope those of you that have enjoyed this site will follow me over there. For those that have tuned in these last few months I want to say thanks. Hopefully you will enjoy the group site. In any event, the site will remain up but barring some unforseen circumstances any posting will be at the Duck. Hope to see you all there!

-bp

It's On...

2005-07-01T14:28:00.000-04:00

The Practical Consequences of Definitions

2005-06-25T00:27:00.000-04:00

Well, the news is a flutter with talk of a new "Asian Invasion". The Chinese state-owned CNOOC (China National Offshore Oil Corporation) has made an unsolicited offer for the US-based UNOCAL which trumps the current offer by Chevron. This bid follows hot on the heals of the acquisition of IBM's personal computer arm by the Lenova Group as well as another bid for an American company, this time Maytag, by the China-based Haier. One cannot help but see parallels (state-led--or state-'influenced'--industrial policy combined with cheap financing) between this incarnation of the Asian Invasion and the original involving the Japanese in the 80s and 90s. The obvious difference between the two cases is that we were long time Japanese allies when the great shopping spree began. This is obviously not the case with China. Additionally, the Japanese seemed more preoccupied with purchasing "trophy assets", such as Rockefeller Center, than firms which could be construed as vital to our economic and national security. This last point is both interesting and salient: How one defines or conceptualizes "national security" can have a significant impact on the kinds of policies one sees as imperative as well as eventual state behavior.

Continue reading at "The Duck"...

Filed as: UNOCAL, China, US, National Security

I guess I'm home...

2005-06-19T09:09:00.000-04:00

After seeing Dan's post on his most appropriate city I couldn't resist taking the test. The result (oddly enough):

Philadelphia

Now this works out rather well since I am attending Penn at the moment. However, knowing my luck and the crappiness that is the academic job market I will probably end up living somewhere in Montana when it is all said and done (just kidding hon). Anyway, the rest of the list is pretty reasonable. Chicago and NYC are definitely in my top three (with NYC being my personal #1). I was a little surprised by Austin and Denver though--never would have guessed those.

American Cities That Best Fit You:

65% Philadelphia

60% Chicago

60% New York City

50% Austin

50% Denver

First Principles and the Truman National Security Project

2005-06-17T20:32:00.000-04:00

Dan Nexon over at "The Duck"recently discussed the debate over at Democracy Arsenal by members of the Truman National Security Project on what a progressive national security platform would/should look like. He provided a summary-to-date of the discussion, which I shamelessly pilfered for this post:

Michael Singer started by posting a series of common principles that he felt had emerged from the Truman National Security Project's annual meeting. At America Abroad, Ivo Daalder took issue with Singer's description of American exceptionalism. Suzanne Nossel also responded to Singer's post, taking issue with each of the three principles that Singer identified as being common to both "Truman Democrats" and neoconservatives. Singer modified, but also reaffirmed, those three principles.

While I agree with much of the project I believe it has a way to go. First, there needs to be a separation between the first principles of a national security policy and the marketing of that policy. Second, I believe there is an overblown concern about Democrats and the use of qualification and nuance when discussing policy, especially when it comes to the use of force. Finally, Signer’s latest argument regarding hegemony and coercion seems to play against the group’s true "center of gravity", that being their vision and appreciation for America as a ‘persuasive leader’, one that is ‘centered in the global community’.

The first three principles espoused by Signer were:

1) American exceptionalism: Like the neoconservatives, we believe that America is the greatest country the world has known. We are historically, morally, and intellectually unique. Unlike the necons, however, we believe we must constantly earn our exceptionalism through our moral conduct. Our uniqueness stems from our values, and so we bear a unique responsibility for living up to those values in shaping and influencing the world.

2) The use of force: Like the neocons, we're comfortable with the use of force for morally good ends. Unlike the neocons, as a general matter, we believe force shouldn't be the default choice for achieving our ends. We're neither reflexive doves nor pacifists; rather, we're pragmatists on the use of force.

3) American hegemony: Like the neocons, we want America to retain its supremacy as the military, political, and economic leader of the world in order that we can maintain our own security, help strengthen the world's safety and stability, and accomplish morally right goals. We are and should be a unipolar power. Unlike the neocons, however, we believe we must constantly earn and affirm the right to exercise that power.

In Signer’s most recent post, "The Passions of the Left?", he takes issue with Suzanne Nossel’s qualifications of each of the three principles. His response left me with a few questions and concerns regarding this project, which I discuss in turn below.

First, Signer weighs in on the notion of American exceptionalism:

American exceptionalism: Do we really believe that America is unique, historically graced, and responsible for the world's greatest ideas? (When Suzanne writes, "We recognize that by claiming exceptionalism, we risk undercutting values and norms whose broad acceptance would advance U.S. national interests," I fear this is an exception that swallows the rule.)

The first question we must ask about American exceptionalism is whether it is a concept a) that is necessary as a grounding principle of center-left foreign policy and b) whether laying out first principles necessitates that we included how to sell the policy to the public (which is where I see the notion of exceptionalism fitting in, not that it makes it a bad thing).

The notion that one’s country is exceptional is hardly unique to the United States. One can quickly peruse the globe and find signs of feelings of exceptionalism in the rhetoric, symbols, culture, and national myths of just about any state. And while exceptionalism may serve as a useful focal point for collective action (e.g. appealing to exceptionalism in order to recruit the support of the public behind a massive political undertaking such as building and maintaining a global empire in the case of the British, enlarging a states global commitments militarily, financially, and politically in the case of the US, etc.) I am not sure what difference it makes as a guiding principle for foreign policy. Exceptionalism seems like more of a rhetorical justification for some bundle of policies rather than a grounding principle. The question we need to ask is whether a belief in American exceptionalism is required for many of the policies that follow (i.e. whether being comfortable with the use of force and maintaining hegemony require first that we believe in vague notions of American exceptionalism). If these policies would still be possible without a strong belief in exceptionalism (by policymakers, not the public) then I fail to see why it must be a cornerstone of a progressive foreign policy.

Suzanne’s point is a valuable one because it forces us to examine whether the benefits of adopting this principle are worth the potential costs. If the costs outweigh the benefits then again, this principle is more trouble than it is worth. For domestic political purposes is might be necessary, but as a founding principle of a coherent policy it is more likely superfluous and potentially thorny vis-à-vis allies and ‘undecided’ around the globe. This also relates to the 3rd point about American Hegemony, which I will discuss below.

Finally, the notion that we must believe that America is "responsible for the world's greatest ideas" also doesn’t make a whole lot of sense to me. The greatest ideas in the world have had many roots—for sure, some emigrated from America to other parts of the world but the flow of ideas has been reciprocal. It is impossible to argue that the greatest ideas can be solely credited to Americans since most thinkers from the US who we would credit with such ideas borrowed heavily from thinkers outside of the US. The works of Jefferson, Franklin, Paine, and Madison (to name a few) were all heavily influenced by thinkers from Spain, France, Great Britain, and Greece to name just a few locations. This is not say that American thinkers essentially produced "old wine in new bottles", but surely we can identify a lineage of democratic/liberal thought which made possible the contributions of American thinkers. From this perspective, to say that America is responsible for the world’s greatest ideas comes off more as hubris than national pride.

Next, Signer returned to the question of the use of force:

The use of force: Are we truly comfortable with the fundamental proposition that great ideas are worth dying for, and that great injustices are worth suffering and pain to rebuke? (I think Suzanne's nuances here probably improve on my post -- she writes, "We are hard-headed about what force can and cannot accomplish, and we're committed to ensuring that force is used wisely in combination with other forms of power." -- but I still am concerned about what "wise use" ultimately means.)

I am not sure about the nature of Michael’s discomfort regarding the Suzzane’s phrase "force is used wisely". It seems pretty straightforward—progressives understand the nature of military force (which is only one form of coercion), what it can accomplish and what it cannot, as well as how plans to use force must be executed in order to ensure that goals are met through its use. I do not see how this can be construed as some type of equivocation or ‘nuance’. In fact, if we want to contrast ourselves against the current administration, the Bush team has always maintained—both in rhetoric and practice I would argue—that using force is not enough. It is how you use force, under what conditions, for what goals, etc. The biggest critique of Clinton’s use of force during the first campaign was not that he didn’t use force but that it wasn’t used wisely (i.e. he didn’t use our military in situations that were clearly in our national interest—the whole "we don’t do national building" theme).

Should progressives be afraid to use force? No. Should progressives retreat from honest and frank discussions of what the wise or proper use of military force is and when other types of power and coercion should be utilized? Absolutely not. Again, I think this comes down to mixing principles and the marketing of those principles.

Finally, the issue of hegemony:

American hegemony: Do we truly believe that America is great and good enough to be in a single leadership position over the world? Especially when China -- which would surely manage the world in a much different (and worse) fashion than us, looms? (Suzanne writes, "But we don't think even a hegemon (even one that has "earned" its status) can rule by fiat." But I believe this drains the concept of hegemony of its core value. In many cases, the ability and threat of fiat is what starts and pulls along cooperation, right?)

While Michael is correct in that many times "the ability and threat to rule by fiat is what starts and pulls cooperation" along, it isn’t what maintains it—at least, it isn’t what has made the current liberal world order as resilient and effective as it has been. Certainly there have been international orders based heavily (if not solely) on sheer power and coercion, but their record of success seems less than ideal. One could argue that the Soviet Union attempted to build its own, separate international order during the Cold War. What the Soviets lacked to a large degree, I would argue, was leadership vs. coercion. Peoples and states cooperated with the Soviets over the long haul not because they necessarily consented to Soviet leadership, but because the Soviets utilized both direct and indirect coercion against them. In contrast, the US liberal order was maintained and more effective (save the occasional French defection) precisely because the US fostered a sense of partnership and leadership. Hegemony (or, successful hegemony) isn’t simply a matter of relative material power, but rather a matter of leadership—without leadership hegemony quickly deteriorates into a game of counter-balancing by other powers which works against US interests. Leadership requires that a first among equals wields power with tact and responsibility.

This does not mean that the US must "allow a global consensus to determine its policies". Rather, it requires that the US shape and inform a global consensus. In his first post on the subject, Signer himself notes that (post link) "these six principles combine into the single center of gravity for Truman Democrats: we believe in leadership, in inspiring the world community to follow us through our generosity, our values, and our accomplishments." I agree with Signer, but he seems to have either forgotten his own position on leadership or failed to square with his view on hegemony. The idea that the preponderance of US power should not be treated as a ticket to run roughshod over the concerns of allies and other world powers

Signer ends his post by noting that "We've got to have conviction on these three ideas. The exceptions can't swallow the rules. Then we can get down to details and nuances, and to specifics on hard cases. But we need to work on the big ideas first." I couldn't agree more. And it is a consensus about the big ideas/principles that needs to be reached before worrying about how to market these ideas. Conflating the two makes this task more difficult. In any case I am excited that there are a group of thinkers discussing and debating this topic. It is sorely needed.

Filed as: Truman Democrats, US Foreign Policy, National Security

Frist-flopper

2005-06-16T17:56:00.000-04:00

This is beginning to get infuriating. Back in March during the whole Schiavo debacle Sen. Frist went on to the floor of the Senate and essentially provided his own diagnosis of Schiavo's medical condition. He made this diagnosis by watching a few video tapes. Now, a day after an official autopsy has proven Schiavo's doctors (you know, the ones who actually spent time with her and examined her for over a decade) correct--she had irreversible brain damage and did not have the capacity to be stimulated visually since the visual centers of her brain were dead--Frist is refusing to take it like a man and admit he was wrong (both in his diagnosis and in his political judgment). Instead of admitting that he was wrong professionally and that he made a mistake Frist is flip-flopping (wait, I thought only Democrats did that....). Today, Frist said "I never made the diagnosis, I wouldn't even attempt to make a diagnosis from a videotape." Here is the transcript from Frist's March Senate remarks:

"I question it [the diagnosis] based on a review of the video footage which I spent an hour or so looking at last night in my office," he said in a lengthy speech in which he quoted medical texts and standards. "She certainly seems to respond to visual stimuli."

The line in bold says it all. Unless Frist is "doing nuance" (again, something I thought only Democrats liked to do...), he is essentially questioning the diagnosis of Schiavo's medical team. And unless I am mistaken, one can either respond or not respond to visual stimuli--he is clearly making a diagnosis (or passing his opinion as a "Dr." off as diagnosis) based on a home movie. Way to go doc, and way to weasel out of standing up and admitting you were wrong, not mistaken, wrong, dead wrong. You have got be kidding me that this guy thinks he is going to be President come January 2009. The Republicans can do much better, and his initials are J.M.

Filed as:Bill Frist, Terry Schiavo

Expediency vs. Ideals or Intrinsic vs. Reputational Interests in Uzbekistan?

2005-06-15T08:14:00.000-04:00

[Cross posted at "The Duck"]

I think Patrick Jackson is on to something when he writes that the current dilemma facing the US in Uzbekistan isn't strictly one of security-vs-morality. Of course, one could (and many have) frame the issue in this way. However I think there is another way to look at the issue. I see the problem as strategy-vs-strategy, or more specifically, intrinsic interests-vs-reputational interests. The Defense Department sees the K2 airbase (K2 is shorthand for Karshi-Khanabad) as an intrinsic interest, one that is vital operationally to fighting the GWOT (Greater War on Terror) and for maintaining the US ability to project power in the region. The State Department on the other hand sees the Andijan massacre and US actions regarding K2 as a reputational
interest, one that is important not for its immediate strategic value but rather for the inferences others will draw about the US.

The current situation in Uzbekistan offers a wonderful example of the dilemma that statesmen face from time to time between intrinsic and reputational interests. It also illustrates the difficulties in implementing a grand strategy that includes a component as amorphous as spreading democracy. A little background (if you already read Patrick's post you can skip this):

Back on May 13th an estimated 200 Uzbek protestors were gunned down by government troops as a result of a massive protest in Andijan's main square (another 500 reportedly fled across the border into Kyrgstan). The Uzbek government has claimed that less than 200 protestors died and the bulk of those were Islamic militants. However, eyewitness accounts and NGO investigations have put the official account into question. Human Rights Watch issued a report about the incident in which they claim that the protests were in no way connected to Islamic militants or calls for an Islamic theocracy. The report said in part:

"Interviews with numerous people present at the demonstrations consistently revealed that the protesters spoke about economic conditions in Andijan, government repression, and unfair trials--and not the creation of an Islamic state. People were shouting 'Ozodliq!'
['Freedom'] and not 'Allahu Akbar' ['God is Great']."

At last week's meeting of defense ministers in Brussels, Russia and the United States collaborated to kill any joint demand by NATO for an international probe into the events in Andijan. Several sources told the Washington Post that the eventual wording of the joint communique regarding the meeting (which merely stated that "issues of security and stability in Central Asia, including Uzbekistan" had been discussed) was the result of a fierce battle between "U.S. defense officials, who emphasized the importance of the base, and others, including State Department representatives at NATO headquarters, who favored language calling for a transparent, independent and international probe into the killings of Uzbekistan civilians by police and soldiers". There was some debate as to
whether Defense Secretary Rumsfeld was openly opposing stated US and State Department
policy towards the Andijan massacre (as Secretary Rice and President Bush have both openly denounced the action and called for an investigation) or simply being noncommittal because
he was not involved in recent high-level discussions regarding the issue. In either case it is clear that the US faces a dilemma in Uzbekistan specifically and with the democratization strategy in
general. The Washington Post has a nice quote that sums up the problem:

"It's like the dilemma we have in the democracy agenda in many places. We have to both press the democracy agenda and still, for example, cooperate when we need to on the war on terror," another senior U.S. official said.

Patrick is right when he notes that the debate within the Administration is not between 'narrow defenders of the national interest' and 'idealistic proponents of a normative consensus'. Both are in fact making value-judgements regarding security policy. The way I see it is that each side is, for whatever reason, placing a greater emphasis on one of two interests—either instrinsic or reputational—both of which are critical to US grand strategy.

What is the exact difference between these two types of interests? First espoused by Glenn Snyder and Paul Deising in Conflict Among Nations (and echoed by Robert Jervis), intrinsic interests are defined as those that are valued for their inherent and immediate material/military quality (e.g. a strategically located airbase, energy resources, high ground, etc.). Reputational interests differ from intrinsic interests in that they are valued not for their immediate value but for how they affect an actor's later bargaining position and the image that other actors will have of a state (e.g. a resolved, powerful actor that cannot be threatened). An example of a reputational interest is the US concern over Taiwan. Most observers agree that the US gains little strategic (i.e. military) advantage by maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Straight. Some have noted that we might value our informal alliance with a relatively (if not juridically) independent Taiwan because it allows us to develop naval choke points against the Chinese, but this is not a view that is widely held. Maintaining Taiwan’s present status is viewed as a reputational interest because of what inferences we believe others draw from our behavior on this issue. The US believes that other actors (including the Chinese, but also other potential adversaries and current allies) use Taiwan as an index or metric from which to deduce information about the US--our resolve, commitment to allies, credibility, etc. If we were to abandon or sell-out Taiwan in the face of Chinese threats the belief is that others would draw the inference that the US lacks resolve in the face of threats and that we are not reliable allies.

So how does this apply to the current case of Uzbekistan? In my estimation the Defense Department views the Karshi-Khanabad airbase in Uzbekistan as a critical logistical hub in the region for both NATO and US operations. In this sense, DOD views the situation as one were the immediate strategic (i.e. military) value of K2 is of utmost importance. In contrast, a group of US Senators (including John McCain who wrote an opinion piece in the FT yesterday on this very topic), the State Department, and probably a number of other foreign policy officials within the administration view our response to the massacre in Andijan as pertaining to our reputational interests.

Reputation matters a great deal for our current grand strategy because of our stated commitment to democratization. Rhetorically and strategically, the administration’s grand strategy views the spread of democracy as a critical component (as I have argued here). The key word is “spread”. Actors in the second camp are concerned about the inferences current and potential allies (as well as those regimes we are trying to coerce into democratizing) will draw about our commitment to democracy depending upon our response to Andijan. Morality does not have to play a role in the State Department’s calls for an open, international investigation into the massacre. Rather, it is how the State Department conceptualizes the interests that are at stake that is most likely determining its position on this issue.

The inferences others draw about our commitment to democracy are of critical importance for a number of reasons. First, if the US is going to convince citizens in target countries that it is committed to democracy above all else. Ignoring the massacre in Andijan because of our intrinsic interest in K2 will certainly work against that goal. The conclusion citizens will (or may) draw is that the US is only committed to democracy in those countries where our strategic/military interests are minimal or that we deem immediate security threats (i.e. Iran and North Korea—cite post article from this morning). Second, despotic rulers who do not wish to democratize may draw the same inference. These rulers may decide that one way to maintain their rule without being pressured to democratize is to provide some vital strategic “good” (such as military basing or intelligence) to the US. Third, appearing to be uncommitted to the spread of democracy may disrupt support from existing allies (and potentially recruiting new ones), especially if those allies have legitimized their aid to the US to their citizens in terms of democratization. If US actions seem to signal that they are only rhetorically committed to democratization allies may have to cut off support.

This certainly isn’t the first intrinsic/reputational dilemma a state has found itself in. In fact, one could argue the US is perpetually facing such choices. My guess is that this one will be resolved more by the actions being taken by the Uzbek government than by the US. In response to recent criticism by Secretary Rice about the incident the Uzbekistan government has limited US access to K2. The US has already began re-routing air traffic to Bagram airbase in Kabul (post article). Additionally, the US today issued a statement denying that the Pentagon was trying to obstruct an investigation in order to maintain access to K2 and noting that $11 million of US assistance was being witheld from Uzbekistan. My guess is that the longer the Uzbekistan government refuses to allow an investigation as well as restricts access to K2 the US will simply adjust its logistic needs and thereby sink costs into some of these other (more sub-optimal at the moment) bases. But don’t quote me on that…

Filed as: Uzbekistan, United States, International Politics

The Downing Street Memo has Arrived in the States

2005-06-13T08:11:00.000-04:00

Way back on May 2nd I wrote about the role the Iraq War was playing in British elections. Of particular interest was a document now referred to as the Downing Street Memo (or DSM). This memo contained minutes from a private meeting Blair held with his staff after a July 2002 meeting with the Bush administration. The juicy part of the memo reads in part:

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.

C reportedly refers to Sir Richard Dearlove, cheif of MI6. Now, the interesting part is the line that states "the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy". Many in Britain seized upon this line as proof that Blair knowlingly lied to the British public about the rationale for the war, as well as the integrity of the intelligence that supported action. I haven't seen exit polls yet, but Blair's Labour party lost a significant part of their majority in those elections (although they maintained their absolute majority over the Torries) and many (including Blair) attributed it to the Iraq issue).

Slowly but surely this memo made its way over to the American media--although it certainly took a while (as bloggers had been talking about it about a month or so before the MSM began discussing it seriously). Rodger Payne has a good post over at the Duck discussing the the reactions of both Bush and Blair to the memo at a joint press conference on June 7th. Both dismissed the conclusion that the memo proved the administration was committed to removing Saddam by force prior to any real debate on the issue.

Now another memo has surfaced. Yesterday morning the Washington Post ran a front page story which discussed a briefing memo prepared for Tony Blair which stated that the US had not prepared properly for what the British believed would be a protracted war.

Saying that "we need to be sure that the outcome of the military action would match our objective," the memo's authors point out, "A post-war occupation of Iraq could lead to a protracted and costly nation-building exercise." The authors add, "As already made clear, the U.S. military plans are virtually silent on this point. Washington could look to us to share a disproportionate share of the burden."

Now, to be fair, this memo was written in July of 2002--almost a full year before the war. It is possible that more attention was given to post-invasion activities before the war began, although I doubt it given what we have learned about the confidence Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz seemed to have about US troops being "welcomed as liberators". There certainly seemed to be a missesimation of just how large of a security vaccuum would emerge in Iraq--one which would be filled by indiginous and outside resistence forces.

In any event, it seems the media and government (following the blogosphere) have grabbed onto these memos with both hands now and they are not likely to go away anytime soon (I believe the House has scheduled hearings for Thursday...). Whether or not they represent a "smoking gun" in terms of proof that the administration misrepresented its reasons for war is besides the point now--either way, perception is reality and this is going to be in the news cycle for a while.

My take on the Iraq War has remained the same since before it started. There was never a single reason to invade Iraq and depose Saddam. Rather, there were a number of reasons. Iraq fit into a larger strategy for combating terrorism and remaking the Middle East. You can read those musings here or here. So I am not as indignant as many are after reading these memos--either because I already knew that this was the case, or that I am interpreting them less drastically than others (make no mistake, there is room for interpretation with these memos, they are not as self-evident as they might appear). For more on these memos from around the web, see here, here, here, and here.

Filed as:Downing Street Memo, Iraq War, United States, International Politics

So how good is Pedro Martinez?

2005-06-09T20:16:00.000-04:00

As a New York Mets fan I can't help but marvel at the acquisition and the performance of Pedro Martinez this season. True, many doubted whether giving Pedro a 4-year deal given his age, loss of velocity, and recent injuries was a wise move by the Metsies, but so far the investment is paying off. It got me thinking--just exactly how good is Pedro? It seems to me that his antics over the years (the midgtet mascot, the Don Zimmer throw down, the threat to peg the Bambino in his *ss, etc.) has to some extent lessened the apprecatiation for just how dominant a pitcher Pedro has been in his era and historically. So following Patrick's lead on the trustworthiness of statistics in baseball (a position I firmly agree with and endorse), I ran the numbers. What they seem to say is that even I underestimated just how good Pedro Martinez is. Arguably, he is the best ever...I tried to take the most relevant stats that are representative of individual performance for a pitcher (e.g. ERA, WHIP (walks+hits/innings pitched), strike outs/9 innings) as well as average number of wins per season and winning percentage (so as to normalize the statistics). As far as active pitchers go (those that pitched in 2004 and have over 1000 innings pitched), Pedro is number 1 in ERA (2.71), number 1 in winning percentage (.705), and tied for second in K's/9 innings (10.4). As if that wasn't enough, I ran some statistics which paired Pedro up against modern pitchers as well as all pitchers going back to 1871 (again, with at least 1000 IP's). His dominance gets even scarier...

[Continue reading this post at "The Duck"]

Filed as: Pedro Martinez, Baseball, Pitching, Statistics

Morning Notes for June 9th, 2005

2005-06-09T08:05:00.000-04:00

Okay, so posting will be more sporadic than I had anticipated. I have an article manuscript to edit, research for a professor to complete, comps to study for, and--oh yeah--I have to work all day. In any event, here are some stories that I am following.

Could the "Non" and "Nee" votes evetnually cripple the EMU?

Wolfgang Munchau had an excellent piece in the Financial Times yesterday about the potential breakdown of the EMU (European Economic and Monetary Union). While some commentators were quick to dismiss the potential link between the rejection by France and the Netherlands of the EU constitution and the EMU which is the basis for the euro (and believe me, politicians were even quicker, attempting to lessen the fallout from the markets), Munchau points to a number of stressors that could build upon one another a trigger a euro-crisis. The most interesting part was the fact that Roberto Maroni, Italy's welfare minister, stated for the first time last week that his country ought to bring back the lira. It was the first time that an EU member state had publicly raised the possibility of abondoning the euro in favor of its previous currency. This type of rhetorical opening is sometimes all it takes to provide others with similar feelings an opportunity to echo those sentiments. And with many in Europe unhappy about the euro (both from an economic and identity/symbolic standpoint) many politicians might sieze on this opportunity to score some electoral points.

Taiwan enacts constitutional reforms

Taiwan enacted constitutional changes this week which, depending on who you are, make any attempt at formal/legal independence either easier or more difficult. Future changes to the constitution will have to be decided by referedums, but these referendums require 50% of the entire electorate--not just those who vote. So if you are China you do not like the fact that President Chen Shui-bian could fast track legal independence by by-passing the legislature, but he would have a near impossible hurdle to clear given the 50% threshold. We will just have to wait and see how China reacts, although I do not think this will garner that large of a reaction given their current focus on disputes with Japan, the EU, and the US.

Filed as: EU, EMU, Euro, Taiwan China

The US, Democratization, and Grand Strategy

2005-06-03T06:25:00.000-04:00

Cross posted at "The Duck"

Yesterday I mentioned the new blog America Abroad which is essentially the international relations arm of TPMCafe. G. John Ikenberry, an esteemed professor of IR at Princeton, had an interesting piece the other day on the seeming shift from a focus on terrorism to democratization by the Bush administration. It was a post in response to one by Anne Marie Slaughter--also of Princeton--who argued that the administration had not foresaken the fight against terrorists for a crusade of democractization, but rather the latter had subsumed the former. Slaughter writes:

the Bush Administration doesn't think it has won the war on terror—that war has just been subsumed into a larger global struggle now referred to as the war on tyranny, or, better yet, the fight for freedom.

Ikenberry essentially agrees with Slaughter regarding this transformation, and believes this was done for two reasons. The first is tactical. He argues that the fallout of the Iraq War has created a legitimacy crisis for the Bush administration abroad. In keeping with his scholarly focus on the construction of international orders, Ikenberry argues that Iraq War did not providfe a "master narrative", a rationale for the war--and implicitly a vision of international order--that other states could feel comfortable with¹. Second, Ikenberry argues the Bush administration had to come to grips with the problem of "extremist violence". He notes that, "looking into the future, it seems all too clear that small groups of angry and determined extremists will find it increasingly easy to obtain chemical, biological or nuclear capabilities and unleash them upon the civilized world." The question is how to deal with this threat. By focusing on democratization the Bush administration is answering this question by establishing a link between politically and economically underdeveloped or failed states. Battling extremism is hard enough, but it can be made easier if developed, politically transparent states exist which deprive these groups of resources and staging grounds. Ikenberry concludes:

If this logic is correct, President Bush’s claim is true that America is less secure when freedom and democracy are in retreat -- and more secure when freedom and democracy are on the march. The essential insight is this: the 'quality' of the governments around the world bears directly on the 'quality' of international security. This is a sort of a rump liberal internationalist insight -- even though it is being articulated by a conservative nationalist. The Bush shift from a focus on the war on terrorism to the promotion of open and accountable government is a step forward. It is a rhetorical shift that seems to also entail a shift in the diagnosis of the terrorist threat. The threat is not simply terrorists who are evil and hate us for who we are. Tyranny and bad government are now seen as integral to the problem.

My reaction to this piece is mixed. While I agree with Ikenberry that the focus on democratization certainly has a practical, strategic element I disagree that the impetus and timing behind the new rhetoric was primarily about repairing a crisis of legitimacy.

The shift in rhetoric for Bush's second term certainly was used as a legitimation tool. However, the focus on democratization as a guiding principle of a grand strategy designed to deal with the terrorist threat was enshrined in 2002 in the National Security Strategy. The connection made between terrorism and dictatorships was evident in that document years before this supposed "shift". I have no doubt that the President honestly believes in the underlying logic of this connection. Ikenberry's contention that the shift was due to the fact that the original rationale for the Iraq War failed ignores the possibility that the war fit quite well into a strategy that already included democratization and the desire to rein in and eventually oust tryannical leaders. If this was the case--which I believe it was--Iraq was a natural and attrative target for a number of reasons.

First, removing Hussein from power allowed the US to begin shifting troops out of Saudi Arabia--this was a central call to arms for many terrorists associated with Al Queda, and while the US will never admit it (because it can't), this move facilitated the removal of one major point of political friction.

Second, Iraq was incredibly weak militarily. A decade of UN sanctions as well as the enforcement of no-fly zones made the invasion and occupation of Iraq relatively simple compared to what similar operations elsewhere would have been (granted, extended occupation has been incredibly difficult and it appears the administration completely underestimated this fact, but I digress...).

Third, the administration needed a "demonstration effect" for their new policy--an example that would demonstrate a) the US was capable and willing to execute regime change if necessary and b) an image of Middle Eastern citizens from one of the most despotic states in the region freely participating in politics which would hopefully encouraged the public in other states as well as freighten tryannical leaders, all leading to one giant snowball of democratization in the region--similar to Eastern Europe in the late 80's early 90's (whether we are witnessing a "fourth wave" in the region which is the result of the war in Iraq is hotly contested. See here, here, and here).

So while the shift in the intensity and frequency of Wilsonian-rhetoric seems to emerge in time for the President's 2nd term, the focus on democratization as a center-piece of policy can be dated earlier. Whether the policy will actually work is anothe question. However, I think its harder to argue that it is simply the result of a legitimacy crisis over the Iraq War. Rather, I think the focus on democratization was there all along--and Iraq certainly (altough not obviously) fit into this strategy.

¹I would note here that Ikenberry does not consider that the administration was also facing a potential legitimacy crisis among its own citizens over this episode. The need to rationalize the war in this fashion after the original rationale--WMD's--fell through certainly played a role and is consistent with his logic.

Filed as:Iraq, US, Grand Strategy, Democratization

Morning Notes for June 2nd, 2005

2005-06-02T08:02:00.000-04:00

Crazy morning so this will be brief...

Another One Bites the Dust

Yet another EU member state rejected the proposed constitution yesterday. The Dutch "Nee", just three days after the French "Non", has plunged the EU headlong into crisis according to the FT. The markets are not at all amused:

Fears of an impending political crisis in Europe is causing concern in the markets: on Wednesday the euro fell 0.6 per cent to an eight-month low of $1.223 against the US dollar, taking its losses since Friday to 2.8 per cent. On Thursday morning however the euro seemed to have made a slight recovery.

This is essentially great news for Tony Blair who can now legitimatley postpone the British referendum (one he was loathe to carry out in the first place). Dan Drezner and The Duck's own Dan Nexon have some analysis. Suffice it to say, while the Dutch reasons for rejecting the treaty are certainly different from the French at some level they both reveal a fundamental problem that Brussels needs to deal with: the enormous gap between political elites in Europe and their citizens.

TPMCafe Launches

TPMCafe, a new group blog of sorts and an offshot of the popular Talking Points Memo, launched on Tuesday and has a boat-load of content. Particularly interesting to me is the America Abroad section which features a collection of rather famous IR scholars pontificating on all things international. Do check it out...

Filed as: EU Constitution, Netherlands, France, Dutch Vote

Morning Notes for June 1st, 2005

2005-06-01T06:12:00.000-04:00

My 15 Minutes

Well, it appears that my new "Morning Notes" format is paying immediate dividends. I was shocked to discover that my post yesterday morning on the "Non" fallout made it onto Slate. Thanks to Rachael Larimore for the exposure and all those Slate readers who have stopped by. This is the closest I will ever come to celebrity...

Speaking of Europe, by the time I post this the Netherlands will be well into their own referendum on the EU constitution. Early indications are, like the French, Dutch voters will reject the constitution outright. The FT reports:

Interview-NSS, in a poll for Dutch television, found 60 per cent of voters against the treaty, up from 56 per cent. TNS-NIPO meanwhile put the No vote at 51 per cent against 37 per cent Yes, with 12 per cent undecided.

Regardless of what the Dutch do the damage has already been done. The mere fact that the French rejected the treaty has at a minimum provided Euro-skeptic camps in other states with rhetorical fire power. The argument will probably go something like this: "If a state like France, which has been at the center of European integration since the 1950's, has enough doubt to vote down this constitution than certainly we should have strong reservations." This is certain to give Blair fits in Britain--as if he didn't already have his hands full convincing the Brits to "go Euro". If the British postpone, which they are likely to do now, future postponements of ratification votes in other member states are sure to follow.

Return of the CDU in Germany?

Last week the ruling SPD/Green coalition in Germany took a body-blow by losing an election in the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia, a SPD stronghold for almost 40 years. In what can only be described as a "convulsive" reaction, current (and, by all estimates, soon to be ex) German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder immediately declared that he will seek early elections this year. The opposition CDU has named Angela Merkel as their candidate for Chancellor. In all likelihood, the CDU and Merkel will come out on top and Germany will have its first ever female Chancellor. Additionally, the election of the CDU and Merkel would likely bring proposals for labor market reforms domestically as well as opposition to Turkey's ascension to the EU internationally (as well as a greater rapprochement with the US)...

Deep Throat

Well folks, the speculation can finally end. It wasn't Rehnquist, Buchanan, or even the lovable Ben Stein. No, it was Mark Felt. The Washington Post confirmed yesterday that the infamous informant was actually the former deputy director of the FBI. It is still astounding to me that a secret of this magnitude could have lasted this long. Oh well, I guess everyone will have to go back to the whole "who shot JFK" mystery now...

Update: As if one cue, the BBC ran this story today detailing the mysteries that still remain after the unmasking of Deep Throat--not surprisingly, the JFK assasination is on the list...

Filed as: EU , Constitution , Deepthroat , Germany , Angela Merkel

Conceding vs. Standing Firm: A new trend in US proliferation policy?

2005-05-31T13:20:00.000-04:00

Cross posted at "The Duck":

Last week I (sort of) complained about the recent move by the US to allow Iran to begin the membership ascension process to the WTO in exchange for a further (not permanent) freeze on uranium enrichment until August, when presumably the EU3 can hammer out a more permanent deal with the Persian power. The US has refused to directly take part in the negotiations, but has worked with the EU3 in order to deploy a number of carrots and sticks. Agreeing to not veto Iranian ascension to the WTO (which has been a perennial event) seems to me to be an awfully big carrot, one that Iran has coveted for a while and which allows them to pontificate on the previous injustice of not allowing them to join (quote or link here), considering that all the US/EU got in return was an extension of the temporary freeze until August. (For a different, yet equally critical take on the recent agreement on the grounds that the US still lacks a coherent approach towards Iran check out this editorial in the FT today.)

Thursday, the Financial Times reported that the US may be signaling to the North Koreans that it would consider parallel bilateral talks with Pyongyang--something the North Koreans covet and the US has vigorously denied them since the crisis broke out. Again, this can be viewed as an example of the US giving in to a key demand in order to simply extend the bargaining game rather than extract any crucial concessions that further its interests. Both scenarios possibly illustrate the decrease in the US's bargaining position (or, more appropriately, the actual reality of this position all along) vis-a-vis these two potential nuclear powers (let's assume for the moment North Korea doesn’t have a workable weapon, which is a big assumption).

In both cases these states have had to give up nothing essentially in return for concrete concessions that they highly value. In each case the US has reversed its previous stance on issues of high salience (granted, in terms of the WTO we have our reasons for wanting Iran in, see Peter Howard's take on this which I largely agree with--but the US certainly has not wanted to deal with North Korea bilaterally, that much is clear). These moves make me wonder whether or not the US has come to the realization that their bargaining position is not as strong as they previously thought. In the case of North Korea they have not managed to make any kind of progress, with the North Korean’s continuing with enrichment as well as potentially gearing up for an underground test explosion. China refuses to play a decisive role, something that many agree is necessary in order to force North Korea to cease development. Iran does not seem to be scared of a US invasion/regime change given that the situation in Iraq has, if anything, signaled to potential adversaries the severe limitations of the US military to invade, occupy, and secure foreign lands—especially to manage two of these operations at the same time. Furthermore, Iran continuously threatened to accelerate its program if the US submitted them to the Security Council for economic sanctions. Economics seems to be of more concern to the Iranians than invasion, yet yesterday’s move essentially rewards Iran economically for a simply extension and not a permanent deal. In both cases the targets of US compellance have stood firm and essentially won concessions while the US has given in.

It will be interesting to see what each target—Iran and North Korea—learns from these recent moves. What conclusions will they draw from recent US behavior? Will further concessions in the case of Iran reassure the North Koreans that the US can be bargained with? Will Iran now expect direct negotiations with the US if they take place with North Korea? Certainly one could view US moves in this way, as a deliberate strategy to get these two states to trust the US more and to believe that their cooperation will be rewarded in kind by the US. However, the US should be aware of the fact that such signals cannot be counted on to objectively convey that they are trustworthy or credible partners. Both North Korea and Iran must interpret US actions through their own lenses that are influenced by previous encounters and the images they already have of the US. Additionally, the realm of international politics doesn’t lend itself easily to trust given the high stakes and the incentives others have to misrepresent their intentions.

Stay tuned...

Filed as: US , Iran , North Korea , Nuclear Proliferation

Morning Notes...

2005-05-31T07:41:00.000-04:00

Trying something new today. Given my weekday schedule this summer I am going to try and adjust how I blog so that I can update the site more frequently. So starting today I will be writing short posts about (relatively) breaking news and developing stories of the day. I will try to do this everyday but it will more likely be every two days. If I find one of the stories compelling enough I might blog at length about sometime in the evening, but that all depends. Anyway, here is the first installment of "Morning Notes"...

'Non' Fallout Begins

Following the French No vote on Sunday to the EU constitution, President Chirac began the cabinet shakeup he promised by replacing Jean-Pierre Raffarin as prime minister with former interior minister Dominique de Villepin. US citizens most likely remember de Villepin as the French foreign minister who became the face of opposition to the Iraq War at the UN. The move seems targeted outside of France, as de Villepin is highly regarded by European allies. Chirac certainly has some PR work ahead of him internationally, as many at the EU are calling for the shelving of the charter for a few years until France and the Netherlands (who holds their own vote June 1st, which is predicted to reject the constitution) can reverse their populations' opinion on the constitution. For those looking for an analysis of why the French voted as they did, we are having a discussion over at "the Duck". Contributions so far include Patrick and myself--Dan's should be forthcoming.

Let the Trade Wars Begin

The US will ask for a WTO dispute settlement panel to halt European subsidies to Airbus. Europe has said they will retaliate by counter-filing over Boeing (classic tit-for-tat strategy). In other news, China is dropping up to 81 export tariffs on clothing and textiles aimed at the EU and the US. The US has already imposed limits on textile imports from China and the EU is threatening to do the same. This dispute is likely to grow in the coming weeks.

"All Fired Up"

Taking a page out of Pat Benatar's book, Israeli Finance Minister Binyamin Netanyahu was a little 'hot under the collar'--literally--during a press conference over the weekend.

Filed as: EU Constitution , France , de Villepin , US , EU , Trade Wars , China , Netanyahu

Update: "No EU for You!"

2005-05-29T17:09:00.000-04:00

According to exit polls French citizens said "thanks, but no thanks" to the EU constitution today. The "No" campaign ended up with 55% of the vote, just about where pre-referendum polls had it. Chirac commented that he believed part of the reason why the referendum failed was due to citizens expressing their displeasure with Chirac's policies rather than a statement on France's perception of the EU. Further analysis is needed to determine whether Chirac is correct, although I suspect that the cast of characters that voted the constitution down included those groups that are most likely to dislike Chirac's policies as well as the EU--stay tuned...

Filed as: EU , France

Blame Newsweek...

2005-05-28T08:01:00.000-04:00

Not going to comment on the new unified theory of global unrest and anti-US sentiment--i.e. Newsweek Instability Theory--simply don't have the strength. In the meantime, check out this animated editorial cartoon which pretty much sums it up (thanks to Bill for the link)

Filed as: Newsweek , Koran , anti-US sentiment

Further proof that Rep. Tom Delay is a complete _________ (fill in your favorite expletive)

2005-05-28T07:11:00.000-04:00

Once again, Wonkette makes life bearable--make sure you actually read the Reuters story at the bottom...

Filed as: Tom Delay

Double Duty...

2005-05-27T19:50:00.000-04:00

If you get a chance, check out Duck of Minerva from time to time--I will be "group blogging" there with Dan Nexon of Georgetown U. and Patrick Jackson of American U. Enjoy your Memorial Day weekend...

"No EU for You!"

2005-05-27T07:36:00.000-04:00

Keep an eye on the referndum vote in France this weekend (scheduled for Sunday) over ratifying the EU constitution. France has become somewhat of a symbolic battle ground for the pro-Europe, anti-Europe crowds. France has long been a driving force in European integration and a "Non" vote in Sunday's election has many worried about its ramifications for the future of the project. The FT reported on Thursday that heads of state who are pro-Europe are undecided as to what steps should be taken if any one of the 25 member states votes "No". The two most likely "No's" at this time are France and the Netherlands (who votes in June). Current EU president and Luxemburg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker has argued that No from one country should not dictate the actions of the remaining states. Juncker notes that all 25 member states should attempt to ratify regardless of any No votes. On the other hand, Britain's Tony Blair has argued that if any state votes No the heads of the EU governments would have to debate what the proper "way forward" should be, indicating that the remaining states should not continue with their ratification measures. In any event, if the French or the Dutch vote No most European leaders would push ahead with thier votes and also push these two states to hold new referendums(even though both states have tried to "tie their hands" by stating this will be the only opportunity to ratify the constitution)--basically keep voting until they get the answer they want. In any event I think the campaign for an EU yes spells a no for Chirac in 2007 (he has indicated he may seek a third term). The French people are becoming increasingly weary of economic reforms that they view as too neoliberal (a main reason why they oppose the EU constitution) and with Chirac essentially placing his political reputation on the line for this issue I think he will be out even if he gets his Euro-yes. Stay tuned...

Filed as: EU , France

South Korea's Central Bank Rocks the Boat....Again

2005-05-26T19:37:00.000-04:00

It seems as if the central bank of South Korea just doesn't get it (or maybe they do--as Matt and I have discussed before--see our comments here). Last week the South Korean Central Bank signaled that it might stop intervening in currency markets, noting that it was now comfortable with its currency reserves. Here is the specific quote in question:

"I believe that we now have sufficient reserves to secure our sovereign credibility so I do not anticipate increasing the amount of foreign reserves further," Park was quoted as saying."

"We now need to take more consideration of profitability and I think we're at a stage where we need to manage our reserves in a more useful way."

Although Park made no explicit comment on the won, the remarks were taken to imply that South Korea was now unwilling to undertake the intervention required to stem its currency's rise.

'Shockingly', this move precipitated a sharp rise in the won against the dollar. Later, the Central Bank denied the report, noting that "The Bank of Korea will take necessary measures whenever the currency markets are unstable...Especially, we will not sit idly by if speculative funds come in to exploit a groundless news report."

Now there are a few ways to look at this (as noted here). Either the Central Banks are playing a game of brinksmanship with the US, rocking the boat just enough to get action that they see as necessary (i.e. reduction of the US current account and budget deficit, an increase in the value of the dollar, etc.), they are incompetent to some degree, or they are trying their darndest to balance the need to rationally adjust policy with the risk of sending the wrong signals to the international markets. I am partial to the third option, although I am becoming increasingly interested in the possibility of the first as a viable strategy (and an empirical reality)...

Filed as: Political Economy , South Korea , United States

Puzzled over our policy on Iranian nukes...

2005-05-26T19:34:00.000-04:00

It seems as though the EU3 and Iran have struck a deal that further delays Iran's (what I see as the inevitable) acquisition of a working nuclear weapon. As a reward for agreeing to extend its freeze on uranium enrichment, Iran will be allowed to begin membership ascension to the WTO. Key to the agreement was the ability of the US and the EU to stay unified and for the US to agree to lift its veto on Iranian WTO membership:

ÂIt was a last-minute thing that could have broken down if the Americans had stepped back [from their commitment on the WTO],Â one diplomat told the Financial Times.

After the US confirmed that it would lift its perennial veto on WTO accession talks, Tehran agreed to maintain a freeze on its nuclear programme until early August, by which time France, Germany and the UK will produce new proposals for a settlement."

So while the US is refusing to take part in talks with the Iranians this latest move certainly illustrates that they certainly willing to bargain with Iran over their nuclear program. My question is why? I seriously doubt that any package of carrots can delay a nuclear Iran indefinitely. Nuclear weapons are viewed as incredibly valuable for states as a failsafe against foreign intervention (with many taking Iraq as an example of what not to do--he who hesitates ends up in a hole--and on the cover of a tabloid in his tidy whities). Iran certainly does not feel overly secure given their perception of the US, Israel and their desire to be a regional power. So there are great incentives for Iran to acquire even a minimal nuclear deterrent (MAD is not necessary to achieve deterrence--for anyone interested see Avery Goldstein's Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution). Given this, and given the hawkish nature of the current administration, I fail to see why they see this move as a good idea--especially when the argument used against providing economic carrots to North Korea is that it will simply by them time to complete production. Why should we view Iran any differently?

Filed as: Iran , United States , Nuclear Proliferation

US Grand Strategy

2005-05-26T18:36:00.000-04:00

For those interested in an erudite discussion of US grand strategy and the hard choices that must be made (yes, currently we are "muddling through" by failing to committ to a single organizing principle--declaratory policy certainly does not match up well with actual policy implementation), check out Stephen Biddle's American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment. Biddle is a brilliant commentator on military affairs and the peice does a nice job of framing the question as one that is more political than analytical--a distinction rarely made by analysts. Check it out.

Filed as: US Grand Strategy , International Politics

Now for something completely shameless

2005-05-17T14:07:00.000-04:00

As you may have noticed I have added a search box to the sidebar for Amazon.com. If you search and buy items from Amazon.com through that little beauty over yonder I will recieve a teensy renumerance which will help me buy books for classes and research at Amazon. The best part is this costs you nothing--well, aside from what your orders costs. So if you are so inclined, please search and buy from my site. It will certainly be appreciated.

Republicans ready to "Bolt" on President's UN nominee?

2005-05-13T07:18:00.000-04:00

Yesterday, the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) voted 10-8 along party lines to send the nomination to the floor for a vote. However, in a surprising move aimed at getting Bolton to a vote, the committee did not endorse the President's nominee. This move sets up an interesting scenario since numerous Republicans, who were not thrilled with the choice of Bolton, now have some political cover should they wish to vote down the nominee. The Financial Times has a good summary here and here. This compromise was necessary because Republican Senator George Voinovich of Ohio threatened to (forgive the pun) bolt, thereby leaving the nomination in committee. Mr. Bolton has not been warmly embraced by all members of his party, and this sets up the interesting floor battle ahead. By receiving a nomination without the endorsement of the SFRC many of those Republicans unhappy with Bolton might just defect.

My take on Bolton is that he is a hardnosed hawk, plain and simple--and there is nothing inherently wrong with that. Now, this disposition may serve one well when they are the under-secretary of state for arms control and international security, but as far as a diplomatic post goes (especially US ambassador to the UN) I am more skeptical. Does the UN need reform? Yes. Has the UN been in need of said reform for years? You bet. But I fail to see why someone with less reputational baggage could not fill the post just as effectively and protect US interests. The main problem is not getting someone to represent the US at the UN who would take a much tougher stance on many issues that the President regards as vital to the US national interest. Many individuals could fulfill that task. Rather, the question is whether Mr. Bolton will essentially provide cover for those at the UN who do not wish to work with the US on numerous issues. They can easily point to Bolton as a "bully" and a hardliner who seeks to run roughshod over the UN and the international community. Now, would he necessarily be doing this--probably not. But it gives a wonderful excuse and political cover to those who do not wish to work with the US (and its a pretty long list unfortunately). Diplomacy is all about the subtle mixure of threats and compromise. By presenting a nominee to the world that tilts too far in either direction the US is asking for trouble. Getting tough at the UN and protecting US interests is possible without nominating someone as polarizing (before they even take up the position) as Mr. Bolton. Now it's in the Senate's hands. Developing...

Update: The Washington Post has a good article detailing who is likely to break with their respective parties on the floor vote--Democrat and Republican.

Filed as: Politics , John Bolton , United States , United Nations , International Relations

Gotta love Wonkette.....

2005-05-03T14:58:00.000-04:00

On a related note, Wonkette has this tasty little tid-bit regarding the President's latest poll numbers and the apparent inability of people to understand what it is they actually approve of.

Filed as: Politics , President Bush , Approval Ratings

How many times can the middle class be the “screw-ee” yet still vote for the “screw-er”?

2005-05-03T12:53:00.000-04:00

Well, I normally don’t post on domestic politics, but the President’s new “progressive” social security plan is just too incredible to pass up. Both Paul Krugman's op-ed and Political Animal provide a good summary and discussion of the proposed ~~canard~~ policy. Essentially, the President attempted to repackage his social security plan as a progressive step to increase benefits to lower income earners while increasing the amount contributed by the wealthy (my, this sounds an awful lot like wealth redistribution--isn't this exactly the kind of policy Republicans quickly jump all over and lable "communist" when proposed by Democrats??). But it in fact would accomplish neither of these as Krugman notes (my emphasis):

"In fact, it's a plan to slash middle-class benefits; the wealthy would barely feel a thing. Under current law, low-wage workers receive Social Security benefits equal to 49 percent of their wages before retirement. Under the Bush scheme, that wouldn't change. So benefits for the poor would be maintained, not increased.

The administration and its apologists emphasize the fact that under the Bush plan, workers earning higher wages would face cuts, and they talk as if that makes it a plan that takes from the rich and gives to the poor. But the rich wouldn't feel any pain, because people with high incomes don't depend on Social Security benefits.

The average worker - average pay now is $37,000 - retiring in 2075 would face a cut equal to 10 percent of pre-retirement income. Workers earning 60 percent more than average, the equivalent of $58,000 today, would see benefit cuts equal to almost 13 percent of their income before retirement."

So, obviously the President has proposed this package because members of the middle class don't vote for him anyway and he is trying to pander to the poor. Right? RIGHT????!!!

Apparently not. Here are the exit polls from November’s election broken down by voter income (the number in parentheses represents the percentage of voters in a particular income bracket):

Under $15,000 (8%): 36%

$15-30,000 (15%): 42%

$30-50,000 (22%): 49%

$50-75,000 (23%): 56%

$75-100,000 (14%): 55%

So what does this tell us? Well for starters, the two largest income brackets, which combine to make up 45% of voters—essentially the most important group—voted 49% and 56% respectively for Bush. Those middle income earners need to wake up and understand how the President's policies (especially this one) actually affect their interests. Stop buying into all the bells and whistles and start learning the facts.

Now, I don’t know about you, but the people I know making between $30,000 and $75,000 are middle class, and they certainly are not “higher earners” as the administration has labeled them. Are they higher relative to those making under $20,000? Well by definition, yes. But this isn’t about relative income, but rather one’s absolute income, their expenses, and their ability to support a family and be able to retire comfortably (the President is supposed to be for stronger families I believe, and unfortunately stronger families cost more). This would be perfectly fine if one's expenses decreased as their income increased. But this certianly does not happen. If you earn $45,000/year when you are young but eventually make $70,000/year over the course of your adult life you certainly have greater monetary resources. However, if over your lifetime you have three children, buy a bigger house, pay for college, clothe and feed those three children (because remember, family is important), and essentially try to save on your own for retirement your expenses essentially explode and that $70,000 probably feels a like a whole lot less than the $45,000 did. So it makes absoluately no sense to treat these individuals as if they are "higher income earners". Given this I can see why so many middle income voters decided to cast their ballots for President Bush. No really, I can....

I will be following this story, as should you....

Filed as: Politics , Social Security , President Bush , Middle Class

The British Election and the Iraq War

2005-05-02T09:13:00.000-04:00

Rodger Payne has an interesting post over at his blog on the row over the Iraq War and its potential effect on Thursday's elections in the UK (You can also see it at Political Animal). While Blair seems set to remain Prime Minister the debate has created an opportunity to view some of the internal memos prepared for Blair before the Iraq War. Payne notes that the most interesting memo includes a rather interesting quote (highlighted below):

“Today, the Times of London printed a leaked document that purportedly demonstrates Blair's intent to go to war against Iraq long before March 2003. Minutes from a 23 July 2002 meeting were considered "extremely sensitive" and "no further copies should be made." Of course, now anyone can read it on the web. Here's a troubling paragraph based on an unnamed "C" present at the meeting (CNN reports that this is Sir Richard Dearlove):

‘C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.’”

Now, ‘But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy’ is an incredibly juicy line—does this mean that ‘C’ was conveying the thoughts and intentions of Washington? Or was he/she merely stating an opinion that the administration was massaging their data to fit the hypothesis that Saddam had WMDs and had connections to terrorism (terrorism that was actually a threat to the US)? Who knows. In either case this is certainly ammo for Bush critics—now the question is whether anyone in the US will pick up on this and run with it…

Filed as: Iraq War , US , International Relations

Long overdue update...

2005-05-02T08:51:00.000-04:00

Lots going on, so I will get right to it...

Iraq, Democratization and the Middle East
The Washington Monthly ran a wonderful report in their May issue on the possible effects of the Iraq War on recent democratization and liberalization (yes, they are two different things) in the Middle East. Not surprisingly, the the seven authors invited to reflect on recent events came to different conclusions (although they all seemed at least somewhat skeptical). Over the next few days two political scientists, Dan Drezner from U of Chicago and danieldrezner.com, and Marc Lynch from Williams College and Abu Aardvark, to further debate and discuss this important topic. The debate itself will be posted at Political Animal starting some time this morning. I have already weighed in with my thoughts here. It is certainly too early to tell--in fact, we may need about a decade after solid democratization and consolidation before we can accurately asses and weight the causes of these transformations--but the correlation itself is worthy of examination. In either case I am sure current events will do for Samuel Huntington's The Third Wave what 9/11 did for his Clash of Civilizations (for the record, the former was flawed but insightful and worth a read given current events--the latter is flawed and lacks strong theoretical and empirical foundations, but that is just my opinion...).

China and Taiwan
Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution wrote an interesting op-ed over the weekend in the Financial Times (subscription only) regarding the likelihood of war breaking out between Taiwan and China--an issue I have also discussed (for links see here).

Here are the highlights:

"In the absence of strong constraints on future high-technology sales, lifting the European arms embargo on China would be a big mistake. There really is a chance of a Sino-US war over Taiwan, which may ebb and flow month to month but nonetheless remains quite real. And any European decision to lift the embargo could make any war more likely and more costly in lives and assets.

The reasons are simple. First, China is serious about being willing to risk war to prevent Taiwan's secession. Second, although many in China as well as Europe cannot quite believe it, the US is just as serious about defending Taiwan. And third, even though American military power remains far superior to that of China, the Chinese do not need to equal US power to make any war over nearby Taiwan very challenging for American forces. Given the right catalyst from Taipei, therefore, US deterrence of China could fail and the world's first true war between nuclear weapons states could ensue.

It is not just China's ruling communist party that considers Taiwan a part of China an increasingly nationalistic population does as well. In fact, the Chinese see themselves as patient and restrained because they are simply demanding that Taiwan not secede, rather than insisting on immediate reunification. They worry that if Taiwan broke away, it would encourage other separatist movements in places such as Tibet and Xinjiang province, and weaken China strategically at the very moment it is poised to regain its status as a global power. China's leaders operate on the assumption that Taiwanese secession would doom their own prospects for holding on to power. At a minimum, they would have to show they had gone the extra mile to try to prevent secession, meaning that even an unsuccessful military operation might be preferable to inaction. And as bizarre as it may seem, the US really would fight to prevent faraway Taiwan from being conquered.

This is true not only because President George W. Bush publicly said so in 2001, but also for deeper reasons. First, US credibility as a dependable security partner would be on the line in any conflict over Taiwan. After a half-century of coming to Taiwan's aid in crises, to back down when the going got tough would cause every other US ally around the world to doubt the strength of America's commitment. Among other implications, more countries might then pursue their own nuclear deterrents. Second, and more positively, Taiwan's vibrant democracy elicits strong support in the US. This goes for Democrats as well as Republicans; it was the Clinton administration, after all, that sent two aircraft carriers toward the Taiwan Strait in 1996 in reaction toChina's firing of missiles near the island.

Unfortunately, many Chinese doubt America's real commitment to Taiwan. Some argue that the US is casualty averse (despite the evidence from Iraq) and would back down from a fight over a distant island - especially a fight against another nuclear-armed state. They realise there is no binding treaty obliging the US to defend the island, and that the language of America's 1979 Taiwan Relations Act as well as other policy statements would give Washington numerous excuses not to fight (especially if, in Chinese eyes at least, Taiwan had clearly provoked the war). Other Chinese believe their recent successes in diplomatically and economically wooing much of the Asia-Pacific region - and Europe - mean that the US rather than China>, would be isolated in any future conflict. Even the military balance gives China hope that it would emerge successful in a crisis over Taiwan. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan remains highly unlikely, given the inherent difficulties of amphibious assault in an era of 24-hour reconnaissance and precision strike capabilities. But China has other military tools and options. In addition to threatening missile attacks, for example, it may be able to conduct a naval blockade of Taiwan. Estimates differ over the strength of the American force needed to defeat such a Chinese attempt, and the losses that would be incurred. But this very uncertainty may give Beijing hope, and a lifting of Europe's arms embargo could give it even more hope. The chances of a Sino-US war over Taiwan are not enormous, but are sufficiently real to be taken seriously. It is for Europeans to determine their future policy on selling arms to China, of course. But the US is on solid ground in asking that any new policy be made with eyes wide open about the huge strategic and military stakes at play."

I am still baffled that many in Europe were surprised by the strong reaction by the US to the proposed lifting of the embargo. How on earth could you be surprised, unless you have been living under a rock for the last 50 years, not mention that last 4 years. Taiwan is considerd of critical importance to the US, less for it offers strategically than for what it means for US credibility and reputation. Outside observers might think it odd that the US still sees Taiwan as non-negotiable, but the fact is they do. Maintaining the status quo is crucial in the eyes of US policy makers and any shift--for instance the lifting of an arms embargo which might pave the way for critical high-tech transfers to China which could begin shifting the balance of power in the region--is sure to draw their ire.

Meet the Mets
Finally, the Mets managed to pull out a victory last night against the Nationals, stopping their losing streak at 4 games. With Pedro on the hill tonight opening a 4 game set against the hapless Phils can a winning streak be far behind?

Tags: Middle East , Democratization , China , Taiwan , US , International Relations

So much for that last deadline...

2005-04-18T08:02:00.000-04:00

Okay, it is official, I am buried under papers and need to prepare for finals, so substantive updates will have to wait about a week or two. Unit then, check out the recent goings on between Japan and China, specifically the continual protests in China against Japan. The protests are largely based on two issues central to Sino-Japanese relations; access to oil and gas reserves in the East China Sea and the content of Japanese history books which, the Chinese claim, downplays atrocities committed by the occupying Japanese during World War II. These protests mark yet another chapter in the escalating tensions in the region (i.e. Taiwan and the anti-secession law, a nuclear North Korea, closer US-Japanese security relations, and US protests over the valuation (or, in their opinion, over valuation) of China's currency).

Also, check out this post from Intel Dump once again illustrating that glib wit of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Given what our soldiers have to put up with on a daily basis they deserve better than snide remarks and jokes about the rough day he is having...

Filed as: Sino-Japanese Relations , Japan , China , Rumsfeld

Slackin', bigtime...

2005-04-04T21:05:00.000-04:00

Haven't had a chance to post in a while--been buried under a mountain of papers and we recently got a dog, whose name is Quint--so allocated blogging time has been drastically reduced. But I will have an update by the end of the week.

Four out of four...

2005-03-28T10:03:00.000-05:00

...well, after several heart attacks this past weekend my entire final four remained intact. Yes, that's right, I managed to correctly pick all four teams including the long shot 5 seed Michigan State Spartans. However, because of the wonder of weighted round scoring I could still lose if 1) Illinois fails to make the final and 2) UNC wins the whole thing. As long as Illinois makes the final I should be alright. Time to settle in for a long, stressful week--maybe I'll take up drinking....

The 326 Protest in Taiwan

2005-03-26T08:14:00.000-05:00

As scheduled, an estimated 1 million people have taken to the streets in Taiwan to protest the anti-secession law passed by mainland China (see pics below).

Publius Pundit is doing a nice job tracking this story. What the reaction from China will be to the 326 Protest, as its being called, is unknown. One may have predicted a few strongly worded threats and military exercises, but with the Europeans surprisingly deciding not to end the arms embargo earlier this week their reaction may be more tame. While US pressure was paramount in Europe's decision not to end the ban, many have also cited the recent passage of the anti-secession law as a reason for the "temporary delay". Europeans were arguing that the embargo, enacted after the repression of protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989 by the Chinese government, was outdated and sent the wrong signal to China and the rest of the world that China should still be viewed as an irresponsible and repressive regime. However, the legs may have been cut out from under the European's argument by the tension created by China's anti-secession law--a case of bad timing on the mainlands part. Since the timing may have only stalled the lifting of the embargo, China is less apt to take any strong actions against the island, since this could further delay a lifting of the embargo (although continued US threats to retaliate against the Europeans in the area of defense contracting and technology transfers is equally if not more likely to be the cause of further delay). However, if the leadership in China sees the protests as a major blow to their faceand if domestic pressure mountsthe mainland may discount the future for the short term and take some kind of action. Then who knows where it could lead...Stay tuned...

Filed as:International Politics , China , Taiwan , United States , Europe

Wolfowitz and the World Bank

2005-03-22T19:56:00.000-05:00

As predicted my posting rate has declined rapidly as spring break has now passed. However, in an attempt to get back on track I'll briefly mention that Matt Tubin has been collecting some great links to statements and news reports regarding the nomination of Paul “they will great us as liberators” Wolfowitz as head of the World Bank. While this has inflamed a great many parties (not surprisingly most of Europe and anyone on the left in the states), it may turn out that the man can actually handle the job. That remains to be seen. What I will say is that this looks like a strategic move on the part of the administration to have in place a trusted member of the team who understands and believes in the strategic importance of promoting democracy—as enshrined in the National Security Strategy of 2002—at the head of an organization that is certainly in a position to do just that. Additionally, while the Europeans are still outraged that the US blocked their original nominee to head the IMF a few years ago (by covnention the Europeans get to choose the head of the IMF while the US gets to choose the head of the World Bank), it appears that there will be no retribution. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder came out on Tuesday in support of Wolfowitz’s nomination, effectively signaling that there will be no united opposition from Europe to his nomination. This of course makes perfect sense since Germany has been falling all over themselves to mend their relationship with the administration over the Iraq War. Opposing this nomination would have essentially put them right back in the doghouse. Stay tuned for more on this story...

Filed as:Paul Wolfowitz , World Bank

Update: Cross-straight Tensions on the Rise?

2005-03-12T18:07:00.000-05:00

To follow up on my earlier discussion of current goings on in the straits:

The US called the proposed law (set to pass on Monday) "unhelpful", China has roundly criticized US criticism of the law, while President Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan has called for a massive street demonstration to protest the law which he describes as a "major threat to regional stability". While many see this situation as one that could potential lead to conflict, a number of experts have weighed in to quell those fears. Essentially, these experts argue that the bill is actually meant to be mechanism by which the mainland can force Taiwan to maintain the status quo, rather than an attempt by the mainland to change it. The argument is that China fears that Chen has been pushing for the island to "creep towards independence" and this law is essentially a way to deter any further moves in that direction. Furthermore, the analysts go on to say why it is not in anyone's interest to begin a conflict and why there are significant incentives against such a scenario.

My problem with this view is the same I have had all along (and typically have towards these types of situations): it assumes that these actors can reasonably interpret each other's motives as well as control the likely responses by their domestic populations. It is assuming a degree of rational control over events. The worry isn't that these parties are itching to change the status quo right now, it is that these moves might trigger reactions that can easily take all the parties down a path to war--albeit unintentionally. China believes its law is merely a deterrent and as such will be effective. But what if Taiwan views it differently? What if this action backfires and emboldens the independence-element in Taiwan (essentially damaging the pan-blue coalition in the Parliament who are not pro-independence)? What if the rhetoric and public demonstrations on the island get out of hand, leading for calls within China that this constitutes moves towards independence, leading to Chen and his party amping up their own rhetoric so as to maintain their credibility and legitimacy with their domestic audience? What if Taiwan misreads US and Japanese criticism as a signal that they will defend the island should they take bold steps against China? If Taiwan reacts boldly with public demonstrations and rhetoric won't Chinese credibility be on the line? Can they afford to stay silent?

All of these questions are merely a way of saying that events have a way of spiraling out of control not because conflict was intended or even in the parties best interests, but because of the problems of misperception and over-(and under-) reaction. The "fog of war" also applies to the early stages of a dispute--one might call it the "fog of crises". Many times parties do not have perfect information and may misread the intentions/resolve of the other party. They may also take steps which tie their own hands, intentionally or unintentionally committing themselves to a course of action (like conflict) that they would rather not take. No one can know ex ante what actors will perceive and what unwitting committments they may make--so regardless of what is in their best interests, actors may unintentionally place themselves on a path that leads to conflict. So to view these moves as merely attempts to keep the peace is, I think, looking at the issue too narrowly and optimistically. Is my view overly pessimistic and more of a worst-case scenario? Sure. But my feeling is that in the realm of international politics such a view should always be present, if for no other reason than to balance out overly optimistic viewpoints . And when we are dealing with a potential military conflict, a conflict that could include the US, China, and Japan we need to have a balanced, cautious view of the situation.

Stay tuned for further updates on this issue...

Filed as:International Politics , China , Taiwan , United States

We could really use a deficit hawk right about now...

2005-03-11T10:48:00.000-05:00

Great post this morning by Nouriel Roubini on China's role in helping the US dollar--and why it is not in their long term interests to do so. This is getting scarier and scarier...

Filed as:US economy , China , Political Economy

Update: The Soft-Underbelly of US Power?

2005-03-10T20:33:00.000-05:00

Things keep looking better and better (thanks to Matt for the link):

Financial Times, March 1oth 2005: Treasury yields shake off Koizumi comments

While we are on the subject of protests....

2005-03-10T20:23:00.000-05:00

...related to the story posted early, Taiwan is planning massive street protests in reaction to the all-but-certain passage of China's anti-secession law. Stay tuned...

Filed as:China , Tawain , International Politics

Catching the Fever? (will all the titles of my posts be in the form of a question?)

2005-03-10T19:14:00.000-05:00

The media is packed these days with stories of a “democratic fever” that has apparently gripped the countries of the Middle East. Elections in Palestine and Iraq seemed to prove that democracy was compatible with the Arab world. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak announced (seemingly out of the blue) that for the first time presidential elections will include more than one candidate. And protestors took to the streets in Beirut demanding an end to Syrian occupation and influence in their country. So it looks like authoritarianism is on the outs in that troubled region, doesn't it? Well, not so much...

Yesterday, 500,000 pro-Syrian demonstrators took to the streets of Beirut in an apparent rebuff of the “cedar revolution” as it is now being called. Their main gripe—the apparent foreign interference in their country by….the US and France!! (Man, it’s been a while since these two guys have been bedfellows) Now the rally was of course organized by Hezbollah, which calls into question the true intentions (and nationality--can you say greyhound?) of many of the pro-Syrian protestors. But considering the small size of Lebanon’s population it is safe to assume that the majority of these protestors were indeed homegrown and supportive of the regime. [ed. although, take a gander at this incredible post on the make-up of the pro-Syrian demonstrators...]

More depressing news rolled in Thursday as Lebanon’s President reappointed pro-Syrian Prime Minister Omar Karami, the same man who resigned amidst pressure from the anti-Syrian protestors only 10 days ago. The stated intention of this move was to form a “unity government” with the opposition in order to guide the country through this 'transition'…a government that would no doubt be dominated by pro-Syrian politicians. And while anti-Syrian protestors obviously rejected the move and the government opposition has initially rejected the offer, one must consider that the powers-that-be believed it was safe enough to do so, which may indicate that the "cedar revolution" may turn out to me more of a "cedar to-do". Why risk a potentially dangerous reaction unless you believed the masses weren't that massive?

Today, as if on cue, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit questioned US claims that recent events signaled a trend toward democratization in the Middle East. Specifically, FM Gheit questioned the stability of the Iraq regime amidst the continued bombings by insurgents, as well as the degree to which pro-democracy currents have swept through Lebanon. Pointing to the pro-Syrian demonstrations held yesterday, Gheit said, “‘other trends’ are also afoot”. Additionally, the Foreign Minister noted that elections in Palestine may be providing false hope to those outside of the region since similar polls have taken place in the past, and we all know how democratic Palestine has been since then…

…All of this points to what should be a cautious view. Is the Middle East on the brink of a major wave of democratization? Maybe. But it is certainly too early to tell. This wouldn’t be the first time that regimes in the region allowed open contestation of government offices or that protestors took to the streets demanding change. The question is whether these small changes, which could easily be viewed as small steps designed to provide short-term political cover for these regimes domestically and internationally, can coalesce into stronger movements for true political change. The track record in the region is dismal to say the least. However, Latin America may provide us with some cause for hope. Many authoritarian/military regimes (something the Middle East does not want for) in that region democratized through small, initial liberalization steps that were intended to provide short-term relief for a perceived lack of legitimacy. Those steps however took on a life of there own and eventually led those regimes to negotiate their exit from power. Hopefully some regimes in the Middle East can walk a similar path to democracy, although I for one am hoping for the best and preparing for the worst.

Filed as:International Politics , Lebanon , Middle East

The Soft-Underbelly of US Power?

2005-03-09T12:05:00.000-05:00

For those that did not see this story two weeks ago (and I am assuming many didn’t, since the US media isn’t all that good at covering stories about international finance—plus, it isn’t the sexiest topic—sorry Matt), central banks in Asia caused a semi-panic by merely suggesting that they would diversify their currency holdings. While the bankers did not say they were going to sell off their dollar reserves they hinted that it was in there interest to diversify their currency holdings. The dollar has fallen drastically against the Euro, and central bankers have considered diversifying there holdings to include more Euros. However, these bankers don’t need to sell off the dollars they already have to cause problems for the US economy—just slow the rate at which they purchase them. Korea merely suggested they would diversify their holdings. An editorial in the Financial Times on February 23^rd sums it up nicely:

“the market overreacted to reports that the Bank of Korea wanted to reduce the share of dollars in its portfolio. What the Koreans actually said was that they want to diversify out of low-yielding US Treasuries into higher yielding securities, which could include riskier US assets as well as non-US government bonds. And they intend to do so by diversifying the flow of reserves, not the $200bn (£105bn) stock. But while Tuesday's sell-off was founded on error, it nonetheless exposed the underlying weakness of the US currency. If the mighty dollar can be rocked by a single paragraph in a report to the Korean parliament something is amiss.”

The events of the 22^nd were quickly dismissed by some as a simple misperception by the markets of the Asian Central Banks’ intentions. Problem solved, right? Wrong. As noted above this episode should act as a warning that something is wrong with the current US economy—a massive vulnerability due to our budget deficit.

For many years the US has been the world’s largest debtor and, unlike most other countries, this has not proven to be a problem. Other states were happy to finance our enormous budget deficits by purchasing Treasury notes—essentially loaning us money—given the high confidence in and strength of the dollar. We are currently relying on the same practice to finance our current deficit, which is an all-time record by the way—currently around $477 billion and set to rise rapidly in the coming years to pay for such things as the prescription drug plan (some estimates by non-partisan analysts say it could reach $1.3 trillion by 2013). With defense spending set to reach an all time high (not that I am complaining) we are even more reliant on foreign governments for finance. Our preponderance of power internationally is dependent upon foreign governments’ willingness to provide us with financing. In fact, in order to cover our current account deficit the US must attract over $2bn of foreign capital per day. Forget about selling off dollars, all these foreign banks need to do is slow the rate at which they purchase dollars and we are in for a rough ride. In the short term this is certainly not in these government’s interests. Asian governments do not want the value of their currency to rise relative to the dollar, essentially making their products more expensive. However, Asia seems to be tiring of their reliance on the dollar and their lack of clout in Western financial circles. As William Pesek has noted, these states realize they are allowing the US to forgo dealing with the problems in its own economy (i.e. the current account and budget deficits). In the long term it is in Asia’s interest to minimize currency outflows and to diversify to a higher yielding currency such as the Euro. The question is will the US be able to clean up its act before this adjustment takes place. Given the likely rise in defense spending and the potential restructuring of social security (the cost of which has also been placed in the trillions) I am, sadly, pessimistic...

Filed as:Politics , Economics

Cross-strait tensions on the rise?

2005-03-08T18:03:00.000-05:00

Recent moves by the Chinese, the US, and the EU has increased tension in the Taiwan straits. This convoluted issue has been quiet for some time, but with the EU set to repeal an arms embargo in place since 1989, China’s pending passage of an anti-secession law, and the US dialing up the rhetoric vis-à-vis China (as well as formalizing with Japan their strategic concern for Taiwan), I would venture to say that the region is poised to become hot once again.

Essentially, the anti-secession law is targeted squarely at Taiwan, regarded by mainland China as a renegade province. To date, China has been deterred from forcibly taking the island due to the balance of power that exists between themselves and Taiwan (largely due to US arms sales to Taiwan) as well as vague US threats to intervene and defend Taiwan should China try to take the island by force. Maintaining the status quo has long been the policy of the US--a status quo that essentially restricts actions in Taiwan that signal a desire for formal independence as well as attempts by China to revise the current situation. However, many observers have noted that while the situation appears stable it could change quickly due to unexpected actions and reactions on the part of the various players.

For example, Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian (a pro-independence figure) has threatened to "retaliate" if the mainland passes the anti-secession law. At this point the law is a sure thing--the leadership in China could not afford to back down for fear of loosing face domestically (as well as internationally). The ball will then be in Taiwan's court, where any number of reactions is likely. The most inflammatory would be a referendum on independence, a measure President Chen Shui-bian has alluded to previously in response to the anti-secession law. While it is unlikely that Chen would risk an almost certain escalation by China in response to the referendum, Chen is likely to take measures that illustrate his dedication to Taiwanese independence as well as the state’s resolve in general. By not reacting, Taiwan risks sending a signal to the mainland that further moves would not be met with much force. Additionally, Chen draws electoral support from pro-independence elements within Taiwan—a failure to react would certainly damage his standing with a portion of voters critical for his political success. While neither party has an incentive to escalate to the use of force it is a situation that could easily arise given the incentives for both parties to demonstrate their resolve and dedication to the issue.

An added bit of complexity comes from moves by additional powers. As noted, the EU is set to lift a 15 year arms embargo against China which the US has vehemently opposed. The embargo was instituted in 1989 after the Chinese government brutally put down the student protests in Tiananmen Square. The US has argued that by allowing the Chinese to purchase European weapons systems China can quickly shift the balance of power in the straits in their favor. A likely response to a Chinese military buildup with European weapons would be an increase in US arms sales to Taiwan, further increasing regional tensions. Additionally, the US and Japan recently reaffirmed their commitment to security cooperation in the region, only this time with an added twist—for the first time they explicitly listed Taiwan as a common security issue. The statement merely stated that they viewed a peaceful resolution to the crisis as on their security interests, but this action was viewed angrily by Beijing since Japan is viewed as its main rival in the region (besides the US). The Joint Statement issued by the US and Japan came on the heels of increasingly suspicious rhetoric from both the CIA and the Pentagon that China’s military buildup is disturbing and threatens US capabilities in the region. It seems that the US is now turning its attention back to China—a security concern that has been somewhat muted since 9/11 and the run up to the Iraq War.

So what does all this mean? Is there likely to be trouble in the straits any time soon? It all depends on the reaction of Taiwan to the anti-secession law. If President Chen takes bold steps in an effort to signal the Chinese—and to this constituents—that Taiwan will not allow China to take such bold steps then trouble is likely to ensue. The mere mention of an independence referendum could be enough to force China to engage in accelerated military exercises. These exercises would likely force the US (and now Japan) to react by sending naval support to the straits (but not actually in the straits) to monitor the exercises, much as the US did during the 1995-96 crisis. In the short run, however, even this scenario shouldn’t be enough to lead the US and China into a direct confrontation over Taiwan. China is still a number of years away from acquiring the military resources necessary to take the island. Even if the EU lifts the arms embargo it is still not clear exactly what and how much the Europeans would be willing to sell the mainland. US pressure may likely limit the extent to which EU arms will actually impact the balance of power in the straits. Until the balance shifts in their favor it is unlikely that even bold provocation by Taiwan, such as a referendum or military exercises, is likely to elicit a direct military reaction by the mainland.

The only possibility in the short run would be ‘war by accident’—essentially a situation where both China and Taiwan take steps that commit them to further action. Increased public threats by both parties could have the effect of tying there hands so that the costs of backing down would be too much to bear domestically and internationally (lets not forget that although the mainland is still politically communist the leadership has used the issue of Taiwan as a legitimacy building measure—failure to act would certainly anger the general public and place the regime on the defensive domestically). This scenario depends less on the objective balance of power between the two states and more on the choices of leaders in both countries, the inferences they draw from each other’s actions and the reaction by both domestic and international actors to these actions. If Taiwan is emboldened by a tough US-Japan response and reads this as a signal that they are willing to enter the fray President Chen may feel the time is right to call the referendum. Such a move would place the leadership of China in a precarious position since there would be domestic pressure to react as well pressure to ensure that the mainland does not look irresolute over the issue in the eyes of the US and Japan.

In any case these moves are sure to lead to a serious diplomatic, if not military, confrontation in the future, if not the short term. It is certainly a story worth watching.

Filed as:Politics , Taiwan , China , US Foreign Policy

Just what the world needs---another blog....

2005-03-08T17:37:00.000-05:00

Despite the fact that the internet is now saturated with blogs of all sorts I have decided to throw my hat in the ring and appropriate space that could be used for more useful endevours.

This blog will essentially cater to those readers interested in world politics, international relations, and foreign policy. How often I can update the site is largely an unknown, as I am a graduate student short on time--although I have an enormous impulse to procrastinate.

Anyway, please leave comments (once I actually get to a substantive post) as I am new to the art of blogging and would certainly benefit from any advice.